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The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) grew from $3.9 billion in 1975 (in
1999 dollars), the ﬁrst year it was part of the tax code, to $31.5 billion in
2000. No other federal antipoverty program has grown at a comparable
rate. In 2000 EITC spending was within $4 billion of the combined federal
spending on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and food
stamps.1
The growth of the EITC has been even more striking given the antipathy
most Americans express toward welfare, at least prior to welfare reform
in 1996, and the rhetoric of both political parties about recognizing the
limitations of government programs.2 The EITC’s popularity relative to
means-tested cash transfers like the former Aid to Families with Depen-
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1. The ﬁscal year (FY) 2002 budget showed total food stamp spending in 2000 at $18.3 bil-
lion and total TANF spending at $18.4 billion.
2. Views on welfare are illuminated by questions on the General Social Survey, which asks,
“Are we spending too much money, too little money, or about the right amount on welfare?”
In the 1972–82 surveys, 54.8 percent of the respondents replied “too much.” In the 1996 sur-
vey, 57.7 percent replied “too much,” although the percentage giving this response had fallen
to 45.8 percent in 1998 and to 38.9 percent in 2000.dent Children (AFDC) and new TANF programs stems, at least in part,
from the perception that the EITC rewards work.
The credit began as part of a broader eﬀort by Senator Russell Long
(Dem.-La.) to derail congressional and presidential interest in a negative
income tax (NIT) in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The initial debates
highlighted a tension that exists to this day. The attraction of the NIT was
that—as a universal antipoverty program—it would provide a guaranteed
minimal standard of living to all in an administratively eﬃcient way
(through the tax system) without having the notches and high cumulative
marginal tax rates that characterize a patchwork system of narrower pro-
grams. Senator Long’s primary objection to the NIT was that it provided
its largest beneﬁts to those without any earnings, and hence would dull the
labor market attachment of poor families. His alternative, initially called
the “work bonus,” would phase in and thus increase with earnings up to a
point.
Over the years, the EITC has played diﬀerent tax policy, labor market,
and antipoverty roles. In section 3.2, we review the political history of the
EITC, its rules, and its goals, and we provide a broad set of program sta-
tistics that summarize its growth and coverage. Various goals of the pro-
gram occasionally come into conﬂict. For example, when the EITC was in-
creased as part of the 1993 budget bill, it was singled out as an important
antipoverty program that has positive (relative to alternatives) labor mar-
ket incentives. Around the same time, however, studies of EITC noncom-
pliance suggested that the credit was diﬃcult for the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) to administer. One’s view of the credit will be inﬂuenced
signiﬁcantly by the weight one places on its antipoverty eﬀects, its labor
market eﬀects, and the ability of the IRS to administer the credit.
The core of this chapter is a discussion of EITC-related behavioral issues
and research. Section 3.3 provides EITC program statistics. As would be
expected with a program that has more than tripled in size (in real dollars)
in the 1990s, a considerable amount of attention has been paid to the EITC
in recent years. In section 3.4, we outline the conceptual underpinnings of
much of this recent work and discuss EITC participation and compliance,
its eﬀects on labor force participation and hours of work, marriage and fer-
tility, skill formation, and consumption. In this overview, we show that
there are theoretical reasons to prefer the EITC to other antipoverty pro-
grams if the objective is to encourage work among the poor. At the same
time, the predicted eﬀects of the EITC are not all prowork, especially with
respect to hours and its labor market incentives for two-earner couples.
But a policy focus only on labor markets would be overly narrow, since it is
clear that the EITC has the potential to aﬀect a much broader set of eco-
nomic behaviors.
Section 3.5 reviews the evidence to date on these behavioral issues.
Given the design and size of the credit, it is not surprising that it delivers
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ine the credit’s labor market eﬀects, as would be expected given that a cen-
tral distinction between the EITC and NIT approach to antipoverty policy
is the likely superiority of the EITC in encouraging labor force participa-
tion. Recent studies have also focused on the degree to which expansions
of the EITC over the last twenty years can account for trends in labor force
participation for single women with children in the United States.
As highlighted in Moﬃtt (1998), many studies over the last ten years
have examined the eﬀects of programs like AFDC, Medicaid, and food
stamps on family structure and children’s well-being. These studies have
been motivated by a growing concern that public assistance programs con-
tributed to the rise in out-of-wedlock childbearing and female headship,
two behaviors associated with the incidence of poverty, especially among
children. Until very recently, however, little attention has been paid to
the eﬀects of the EITC expansions on these behaviors. We discuss recent
EITC-related studies of this issue. We also discuss recent studies of the
EITC’s eﬀect on consumption patterns of the poor. Because the credit is
administered through the nation’s (and, in some cases, state’s) income tax
systems, EITC payments to low-income households are typically received
once a year, as an adjustment to tax liabilities or refunds. This payment
pattern contrasts with the monthly payments typically associated with
AFDC/TANF and food stamps, and it may provide a way to gain addi-
tional insight into the nature of credit markets and consumption behavior
for low-income families.
Our goal in section 3.5 is to summarize succinctly what has been done,
to evaluate the strengths of this work, and to identify areas where addi-
tional work could be useful to either verify existing conjectures or alter
what we thought was known.
In the ﬁnal sections, we brieﬂy discuss EITC-related policy debates and
highlight what, if any, critical economic issues underlie these debates. We
also brieﬂy identify issues on which future research is needed.
3.2 Program History, Rules, and Goals
It is not surprising that fundamental tensions in the design of the safety
net emerge at diﬀerent points in the program’s history, given the EITC’s
status as the largest cash or near-cash antipoverty program.3 In the mid-
1960s and early 1970s there was a great deal of discussion about the ap-
propriate design of antipoverty policy. At the risk of oversimplifying, one
part of the policy debate focused on either direct earnings subsidies (of
which the EITC is one) or on subsidies paid to employers to hire disad-
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3. Our discussion of the EITC’s political history comes directly from Liebman’s (1997a) and
Ventry’s (2000) interesting accounts.vantaged workers. Remnants of the latter approach are found in the cur-
rent, modest Work Opportunity and Welfare-to-Work tax credits that are
part of the federal income tax.4 A problem with earnings or employment
subsidies is that they do nothing for adults (and the children that live with
them) who are unable or unwilling to work. Consequently, they must be
matched with programs that help provide food, housing, health care, and
other basic needs to those not in the labor market.
The EITC was established amid the political debate over the NIT that
occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. The NIT held great promise to the early
designers of the war on poverty since it would solve the diﬃcult integration
issues that arise with categorical antipoverty programs—the need for bu-
reaucracies to administer and enforce eligibility and beneﬁt rules and the
need to mitigate potentially high marginal tax rates that recipients face as
earnings increase. Partly for these reasons, in 1966 an NIT was the cap-
stone of the Oﬃce of Economic Opportunity’s (the federal agency in
charge of conducting the war on poverty) plan to eradicate poverty. Presi-
dent Johnson, however, opposed the NIT and a leading alternative pro-
posal at the time, a guaranteed annual income, on the grounds that both
proposals undermined work eﬀort. Without the support of the president,
an NIT was not adopted. Nevertheless, in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the government launched the ﬁrst widespread social experiments, the Gary
(Indiana), New Jersey, Iowa, and Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Ex-
periments, to examine the eﬀects of an NIT.
In 1969 President Nixon introduced an NIT called the Family Assis-
tance Plan (FAP) that would have replaced the AFDC program. Although
it enjoyed widespread initial support, the FAP was subsequently attacked
by liberals as being insuﬃciently generous and by conservatives as being
overly expensive and having insuﬃciently stringent work requirements.
Russell Long, then chair of the Senate Finance Committee, opposed the
FAP and, as an alternative, designed a proposal targeted at those willing to
work. His 1972 proposal included a large public service jobs component
and a “work bonus” equal to 10 percent of wages subject to Social Secu-
rity taxation. The FAP was defeated in 1972, but Senator Long aggres-
sively pushed his work bonus scheme over the next three years. His eﬀorts
were aided by the conﬂuence of three events. First, from 1960 to 1970 the
payroll tax rate increased to 4.8 percent from 3.0 percent (on both employ-
ers and employees), and it increased further to 5.8 percent in 1973, which
focused attention on the rising tax burdens of low-income families. Sec-
ond, fostered in part by the income maintenance experiments, there con-
tinued to be a great deal of intellectual attention paid to the NIT and NIT
alternatives in think tanks, universities, and government agencies. Third, a
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4. For further discussion of employment subsidies and a broader treatment of employment
strategies for low-wage labor markets, see Bishop and Haveman (1978) and Haveman (1996).recession started in 1974. This prompted members of Congress in 1975 to
try to stimulate aggregate demand by refunding $8.1 billion in 1974 income
taxes and cutting 1975 income taxes by an additional $10 billion. With the
passage of a tax bill in 1975, Senator Long was able to enact a variant of his
work bonus, called the EITC, on a temporary, eighteen-month basis. The
provision added a 10 percent supplement to wages up to $4,000 ($12,387 in
1999 dollars) for taxpayers with children, and it phased out at a 10 percent
rate over the $4,000 to $8,000 income range.
Senator Long undoubtedly understood that once a provision is in the tax
code, it is likely to remain. Indeed, the EITC remained in the tax code each
subsequent year until it was made permanent in 1978. Legislation in 1978
also added a ﬂat range to the EITC’s phase-in and phaseout ranges, as
shown in ﬁgure 3.1.5 An “advance payment” option was also added to the
credit in 1978, so that workers would be able, if they desired, to receive the
credit incrementally throughout the year.
Spending on the safety net slowed in the late 1970s and shrank in the
1980s. Between 1978 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), the fact
that the tax credit (and tax code) was not indexed for inﬂation caused a
substantial erosion of the EITC’s real value. The TRA86, as part of its
provisions to eliminate income taxes on families with incomes below the
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Fig. 3.1 The Earned Income Tax Credit for a family with two or more children in
1979 and 2001
Notes: 1   subsidy rate; 2   maximum beneﬁt for two or more children; 3   beneﬁt reduc-
tion (implicit tax) rate.
5. The phase-in rate for the credit was 10 percent on earnings up to $5,000, for a maximum
credit of $500. The maximum credit was available for taxpayers with earnings between $5,000
and $6,000. The phaseout rate for the credit was 12.5 percent on incomes between $6,000 and
$10,000.poverty line, increased the EITC to the point where the maximum credit in
1987 equaled the real value of the credit in 1975. The TRA86 also indexed
the credit for inﬂation. During this period the EITC continued to be sup-
ported by liberals and conservatives, both of whom were sympathetic to
the idea of reducing tax burdens on low-income families and rewarding
work.
Through much of the 1980s and into the 1990s, deﬁcits were a dominant
topic in Washington economic policy discussions. By 1990, annual deﬁcit
forecasts exceeding $300 billion—“as far as the eye can see”—were com-
mon, so that year President Bush agreed to abandon his “no new taxes”
pledge and meet with Democratic leaders of Congress to fashion deﬁcit-
reduction legislation. The tortuous negotiations led to the 1990 tax bill,
which phased out exemptions and itemized deductions on high-income
taxpayers and raised the highest marginal tax rate from 28 percent to 31
percent. Whereas distributional issues have always played a role in tax pol-
icy, they played an exceptionally important role in 1990, perhaps because
of the antipathy of Democratic congressional leaders toward the Republi-
can president and the sense of those leaders that policy in the 1980s disfa-
vored low-income families.6 The EITC proved to be a straightforward way
to alter the distributional characteristics of various deﬁcit-reduction pack-
ages, and distributional tables became an important factor behind the 1990
EITC expansion that was phased in over three years. In 1991, the credit for
the ﬁrst time was also made larger for taxpayers with two or more children
than for taxpayers with one child.
Another major change to the EITC occurred as part of the 1993 budget
bill. In his ﬁrst State of the Union Address, President Clinton said, “The
new direction I propose will make this solemn, simple commitment: By ex-
panding the refundable earned income tax credit, we will make history; we
will reward the work of millions of working poor Americans by realizing
the principle that if you work forty hours a week and you’ve got a child in
the house, you will no longer be in poverty.” This declaration completed the
evolution of the EITC from Senator Long’s modest “work bonus” to a ma-
jor antipoverty initiative. President Clinton set a target for the EITC: full-
time work at the minimum wage plus the EITC (and any food stamps a
family is eligible for) should be enough to raise the family’s net-of-payroll-
tax income above the poverty line. To achieve this goal, the EITC was again
increased, and increased sharply for families with two or more children.7
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6. Many of the newspaper articles about 1990 budget talks emphasized distributional is-
sues. See, for example, “GOP’s Tax Proposal Said to Favor Wealthy; Budget Talks Proceed-
ing at ‘Glacial’ Pace,” Washington Post, 14 September 1990, A12, and “Budget Negotiations
Recess Amid Confusion on Progress; Oﬃcials Disagree on Extent of Disagreement,” Wash-
ington Post, 18 September 1990, A1.
7. The speciﬁc goal was achieved only for families with fewer than three children, and only
after the minimum wage was increased in 1996 and 1997.The 1993 budget bill (and EITC expansion) passed by one vote in the
Senate and received not a single supporting Republican vote. This too
marked a transformation in the EITC’s political history. For the ﬁrst time,
the EITC became a policy linked exclusively to Democrats. In subsequent
years, there have been highly partisan battles over EITC-related issues.
3.2.1 EITC Rules
To receive the earned income credit, taxpayers ﬁle their regular tax re-
turn and ﬁll out the six-line Schedule EIC that gathers information about
qualifying children. The EITC is refundable, meaning that it is paid out by
the Treasury regardless of whether the taxpayer has any federal income tax
liability. There are several basic tests for EITC eligibility. The taxpayer
must have both earned and adjusted gross income below a threshold that
varies by year and by family size. Most EITC payments go to taxpayers
with at least one “qualifying child.” A qualifying child needs to meet age,
relationship, and residence tests. The age test requires the child to be
younger than nineteen, younger than twenty-four if a full-time student, or
any age if totally disabled. The relationship test requires the claimant to be
the parent or the grandparent of the child or for the child to be a foster
child.8 Under the residence test the qualifying child must live with the tax-
payer at least six months during the year.9 Another rule limits the sum of
taxable and tax-exempt interest, dividends, net capital gains, rents, royal-
ties, and “passive” income to less than $2,350 (indexed for inﬂation).
In 2001, taxpayers with two or more children could receive a credit of 40
percent of income up to $10,020, for a maximum credit of $4,008. Taxpay-
ers (with two or more children) with earnings between $10,020 and $13,090
received the maximum credit. Their credit was reduced by 21.06 percent of
earnings between $13,090 and $32,121. The EITC schedule in 2001 for
families with two or more children is shown in ﬁgure 3.1. A small credit
available for childless taxpayers between the ages of twenty-four and sixty-
ﬁve with very low incomes was added in 1994. The credit rate for these tax-
payers is 7.65 percent, and the maximum credit in 2001 was $364. Table 3.1
shows the complete evolution of income eligibility thresholds, credit rates,
and phaseout (or implicit tax) rates.
Panel A of ﬁgure 3.2shows total tax payments and marginal tax rates for
two-parent, two-child families in Illinois (a state with relatively high tax
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8. Until late 1999, a foster child was any child for whom the claimant cared for “as if the
child is their own.” The caring stipulation still holds, but now the child must also be placed in
the home by an authorized placement agency. Prior to the 2001 tax legislation, EITC-eligible
foster children also needed to live with the taxpayer for twelve, rather than six, months.
9. In 1990 (tax year 1991) the residency and AGI tiebreaker (to be discussed) tests replaced
a support test, since in principle it is easier to verify where a child lives than it is to verify
who supports a child. Under the support test the taxpayer had to pay for at least half the
child’s support, where items like transfer payments (e.g., AFDC and housing subsidies) and
child support were not considered support provided by the taxpayer.Table 3.1 Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters, 1979–2001 (in nominal dollars)
Phase-in Phase-in Max Phaseout Phaseout
Year Rate (%) Range ($) Credit ($) Rate (%) Range ($)
1975–78 10.0 0–4,000 400 10.00 4,000–8,000
1979–84 10.0 0–5,000 500 12.50 6,000–10,000
1985–86 11.0 0–5,000 550 12.22 6,500–11,000
1987 14.0 0–6,080 851 10.00 6,920–15,432
1988 14.0 0–6,240 874 10.00 9,850–18,576
1989 14.0 0–6,500 910 10.00 10,240–19,340
1990 14.0 0–6,810 953 10.00 10,730–20,264
1991a 16.7b 0–7,140 1,192 11.93 11,250–21,250
17.3c 1,235 12.36 11,250–21,250
1992a 17.6b 0–7,520 1,324 12.57 11,840–22,370
18.4c 1,384 13.14 11,840–22,370
1993a 18.5b 0–7,750 1,434 13.21 12,200–23,050
19.5c 1,511 13.93 12,200–23,050
1994 23.6b 0–7,750 2,038 15.98 11,000–23,755
30.0c 0–8,245 2,528 17.68 11,000–25,296
7.65d 0–4,000 306 7.65 5,000–9,000
1995 34.0b 0–6,160 2,094 15.98 11,290–24,396
36.0c 0–8,640 3,110 20.22 11,290–26,673
7.65d 0–4,100 314 7.65 5,130–9,230
1996 34.0b 0–6,330 2,152 15.98 11,610–25,078
40.0c 0–8,890 3,556 21.06 11,610–28,495
7.65d 0–4,220 323 7.65 5,280–9,500
1997 34.0b 0–6,500 2,210 15.98 11,930–25,750
40.0c 0–9,140 3,656 21.06 11,930–29,290
7.65d 0–4,340 332 7.65 5,430–9,770
1998 34.0b 0–6,680 2,271 15.98 12,260–26,473
40.0c 0–9,390 3,756 21.06 12,260–30,095
7.65d 0–4,460 341 7.65 5,570–10,030
1999 34.0b 0–6,800 2,312 15.98 12,460–26,928
40.0c 0–9,540 3,816 21.06 12,460–30,580
7.65d 0–4,530 347 7.65 5,670–10,200
2000 34.0b 0–6,920 2,353 15.98 12,690–27,413
40.0c 0–9,720 3,888 21.06 12,690–31,152
7.65d 0–4,610 353 7.65 5,770–10,380
2001 34.0b 0–7,140 2,428 15.98 13,090–28,281
40.0c 0–10,020 4,008 21.06 13,090–32,131
7.65d 0–4,760 364 7.65 5,950–10,708
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means (1998, p. 867). 1998 through
2001 parameters come from Internal Revenue Service Publication 596.
aBasic credit only. Does not include supplemental young child or health insurance credits.
bTaxpayers with one qualifying child.
cTaxpayers with more than one qualifying child.
dChildless taxpayers.The Earned Income Tax Credit 149
A
B
Fig. 3.2 A, Taxes and marginal rates, family of four, Illinois, 1998; B, Taxes and
marginal rates, family of four, Illinois, 1984 (in $ 1998)
Notes: Calculations only reﬂect the eﬀects of the state and federal tax system and do not in-
clude the eﬀects of transfer programs. See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for details of the
NBER’s TAXSIM model used for these calculations.
rates on low-income families) in 1998.10 We assume workers bear the full
burden of payroll taxes, so the employer and employee share of payroll
taxes is 14.2 percent.11 The marginal tax rate line is initially at –25.8 per-
cent, reﬂecting the sum of the 14.2 percent eﬀective payroll tax rate and
10. Nineteen states impose positive (but typically small) state income taxes on families of
four with incomes below the poverty line (Johnson 2001).
11. Employers and employees both contribute 7.65 percent of earnings as payroll taxes, but
the standard incidence assumption for payroll taxes implies that after-tax earnings would be
7.65 percent larger in the absence of payroll taxes, so the eﬀective payroll tax rate is (0.153/
1.0765) or 14.2 percent.the –40 percent EITC rate. The ﬂat portion of the EITC occurs around
$10,000, where the Illinois household would face a 3 percent marginal
state tax rate. Eﬀective rates are 38.3 percent over much of the phaseout
range, reﬂecting the sum of the 14.2 percent payroll tax, the 21.1 percent
EITC phaseout, and the 3 percent Illinois state income tax. Rates jump to
53.3 percent between $25,000 and $29,000 as this family enters the 15 per-
cent bracket of the federal income tax.12 The corresponding average tax
burdens are shown in the bars. Two-parent, two-child Illinois families
would have negative combined income and payroll taxes up to roughly
$17,200.13
Panel B of ﬁgure 3.2 shows the analogous situation for the same type of
family in 1984, before the 1986 tax reform, and the 1990 and 1993 EITC ex-
pansions, all of which reduced taxes on low-income families. The pattern
of marginal and average tax rates is strikingly diﬀerent from what applied
in 1998. The payroll tax (7 percent on employers and employees) was al-
most as high as it is now, resulting in an eﬀective rate of 13.1 percent. The
EITC was only 10 percent on incomes up to $7,844 (in 1998 dollars), so
even taxpayers with very low incomes faced positive marginal rates. The
EITC was phased out at a 12.5 percent rate beginning at $9,413 (again, in
1998 dollars). In addition, the 11 percent federal marginal tax bracket
started at around $9,413 of income. Thus, all but the lowest-income fami-
lies faced marginal tax rates of at least 28 percent, and some faced signiﬁ-
cantly higher marginal rates.
In calendar year 2001, fourteen states and the District of Columbia had
EITCs as part of their state income tax systems.14 The parameters of these
credits are summarized in table 3.2. Most are structured as percentages of
the federal credit and use the same eligibility deﬁnitions. In New York, for
example, the state EITC was 25 percent of the federal credit in 2001, rising
to 30 percent by 2003. Ten of the state EITCs (including D.C.) are refund-
able, and most make the credit available to workers without qualifying chil-
dren.
Two unusual features show up in state EITCs. Wisconsin’s state EITC
has a three-tiered schedule equaling 4 percent of the federal credit for tax-
payers with one child, 14 percent of the federal credit for taxpayers with
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12. The EITC phaseout rate is lower for taxpayers with one child, but because they only re-
ceive one child credit and have one less personal exemption, one-child families in 2002 begin
to pay the federal 10 percent marginal income tax rate at an income of $22,850. Hence, EITC
recipients with one child and incomes between $22,850 and $29,201 have cumulative marginal
tax rates around 40 percent (including payroll taxes).
13. Low-income families would generally ﬁle returns because their incomes exceed ﬁling
thresholds or to get back withheld taxes. With the $600 child credit along with exemptions of
$3,000 and the standard deduction of $7,850, a married couple with two children in 2002 will
not have a positive income tax liability until their earnings exceed $31,850, even without the
EITC.
14. This discussion is from Johnson (2001).two children, and 43 percent of the federal credit for taxpayers with three
or more children. This schedule was developed with explicit reference to
the higher incomes needed to keep families with three or more children out
of poverty. The Minnesota schedule includes a second phase-in range to
combat the problem that increases in wages or hours for certain minimum-
wage workers made them no better oﬀ because of the loss of cash assis-
tance and food stamps and increases in taxes (see Johnson 2001, page 21,
for more details).
The state credits in combination with the federal credit can be substan-
tial. A family with three or more children earning $9,600 in Wisconsin, for
example, could receive a combined state and federal EITC of $5,457, or a
57 percent supplement to their earned income.
3.2.2 Interaction with Other Social Welfare Programs
The tax system operates independently of transfer programs, so there is
relatively little interaction between the EITC and other programs. In 1979
(as part of a technical corrections bill) Congress required both advance and
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Table 3.2 State Earned Income Tax Credits, Tax Year 2001
Percentage of Federal Credit
Refundable credits
Colorado (1999) 10
District of Columbia (2000) 25
Kansas (1998) 10
Maryland (1987)a 16 (rising to 20 in 2003)
Massachusetts (1997) 15
Minnesota (1991) Averages 33%, varies by earningsb
New Jersey (2000) 15 (20% by 2003), limited to families with 
incomes below $20,000
New York (1994) 25 (30% by 2003)
Vermont (1988) 32






Rhode Island (1975) 25.5
Source: Johnson (2001, particularly Table 4). Adoption years are from Dickert-Conlin and
Houser (2002), which in turn are from Johnson.
Note: State names are followed by year adopted (in parentheses).
aA Maryland taxpayer may claim a refundable credit or a nonrefundable credit (equal to 50
percent of the federal credit), but not both.
bMinnesota’s credit for families with children, unlike the other credits shown in the table, is
not expressly structured as a percentage of the federal credit. Depending on income levels, the
credit may range from 22 percent to 46 percent of the federal credit.lump-sum EITC payments to be treated as earned income for AFDC, food
stamp, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. The 1981 tax
legislation went even further in requiring welfare agencies to assume that
individuals eligible for both the EITC and AFDC received the EITC incre-
mentally through the year, thus likely lowering AFDC and food stamp ben-
eﬁts. In 1984 this position was reversed and states were allowed to reduce
AFDC beneﬁts only when they could verify that individuals actually re-
ceived the EITC. The 1990 tax legislation prohibited the counting of the
EITC as income or as a resource in the month received or in the following
month when determining eligibility for AFDC, Medicaid, food stamps,
SSI, and low-income housing beneﬁts. Finally, the 1993 Mickey Leland
Hunger Act prohibited counting the EITC for the ﬁrst twelve months after
receipt for food stamp eligibility and beneﬁts. Beyond these time intervals,
the EITC could cause potential recipients to fail program asset tests.
Since the abolition of AFDC, it has not yet become clear how the EITC
will interact with state TANF programs. There are two major issues. First,
states now have the authority to count the EITC as income when deter-
mining eligibility for their welfare programs. Second, many TANF pro-
grams contain employer subsidies and other job-related activities, which
may or may not trigger tax obligations and potential EITC payments. The
1997 budget bill made clear that the EITC could not be claimed on income
resulting from “community service” and “work experience” jobs funded
under TANF. Other situations will be judged by their “facts and circum-
stances” under the general welfare doctrine.15The law is not yet well devel-
oped in this area.
3.2.3 Quality Control and Noncompliance
Relative to alternative delivery mechanisms, the EITC is inexpensive to
administer. Most EITC recipients would be required to ﬁle a tax return
even in the absence of the credit, so the marginal cost of obtaining the
EITC is simply the small cost of ﬁlling out Schedule EIC. The cost to the
IRS is also quite small. The IRS has a budget of roughly $8 billion to serve
some 120 million individual taxpayers and 15 million corporations. The in-
cremental cost of administering the EITC is surely a very small fraction of
this total. The costs of administering two other major income-support pro-
grams for low-income families are much higher. Administrative costs in ﬁs-
cal year (FY) 1995 were $3.7 billion for food stamps and $3.5 billion for
AFDC, although a signiﬁcant portion of those costs also paid for client
services.
A system based largely on self-assessment (like the U.S. income tax) will
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15. A loose description of the general welfare doctrine is that if payments are made for the
general welfare, meaning that payments are public support for a disadvantaged family, they
are not taxable and do not trigger the EITC. If payments are more job-related, they are less
likely to be viewed as payments made to support the general welfare and more like compen-
sation for services rendered. In this case they would be taxable and trigger the EITC.have lower administrative costs than a more bureaucratic approach, but it
will also have higher noncompliance. The most recent study of EITC non-
compliance examined returns ﬁled in 2000 (for tax year 1999) and found
that of the $31.3 billion claimed in EITC, between $8.5 and $9.9 billion, or
27.0 to 31.7 percent of the total, exceeded the amount to which taxpayers
were eligible (IRS 2002a).
Of the errors the IRS was able to classify, roughly half involve qualify-
ing-child errors.16 About half of these arose because the child claimed was
not the taxpayer’s qualifying child. Of these errors, the most common prob-
lem was that EITC-qualifying children failed to live for at least six months
(see footnote 8 for the rules applying to foster children) with the taxpayer
who was claiming the child. Reasons for mistakes of this type can run the
gamut from innocent taxpayers running afoul of complex IRS rules to
fraud. Consider, for example, a divorced couple whose divorce agreement
gives the dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent, who in turn is
regularly paying child support. Since the noncustodial parent receives the
dependency exemption, that parent could easily assume that he or she
could also claim the child to receive the EITC if he or she is otherwise qual-
iﬁed. But in this case the claim would be inappropriate, since the child does
not live with the claimant for more than six months. In the category of clear
noncompliance, consider the situation described in the ethnographic study
of Romich and Weisner (2000). They write that “one woman relies on her
mother to baby-sit her younger daughter every weekend. The grandmother
also buys school clothes for the child. In return for this care, the grand-
mother ‘gets hers back at the end of the year’ by (illegally) ﬁling the child
as her dependent and receiving an EITC” (p. 1256).
Two other sources of qualifying-child errors arise with the adjusted gross
income (AGI) tiebreaker and relationship rules. The AGI tiebreaker rule
stipulated that if two people could legitimately claim the same EITC-
qualifying child (such as a mother and grandmother in the same house),
the one with the greater income was supposed to. Something like a
tiebreaker rule is necessary to establish legitimacy in cases where more
than one taxpayer claims the credit based on the same child. But it led to
outcomes where, for example, a parent who lived and cared for a child
could not claim the child because the child’s grandparent also lived in the
house and had a higher income. The AGI tiebreaker rule was simpliﬁed be-
ginning in 2002 and now applies only if two taxpayers actually claim the
same EITC-qualifying child. This change should signiﬁcantly reduce er-
rors related to the AGI tiebreaker rules, which accounted for 17.2 percent
of all errors in 1999. The relationship test is violated when the person
claiming the EITC-qualifying child is not the child’s parent (including the
parent of an adopted child, stepchild, or foster child) or grandparent.
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16. Also see McCubbin (2000), Scholz (1997), U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce (1998), and
Holtzblatt (1991) for discussions of earlier EITC compliance studies.The IRS found that 21.4 percent of overclaims resulted from income-
reporting errors. These problems may arise from both underreporting and
overreporting income (including underreporting of investment income,
which could make a taxpayer ineligible for the EITC). This category also
includes situations where a married couple living together chooses to ﬁle
two separate tax returns (perhaps two head-of-household returns, or one
head-of-household and one single return), strategically splitting their in-
comes and children to maximize the EITC.
Another source of EITC errors arose in situations where the taxpayer
ﬁled as single or head of household but should have used the married-
ﬁling-separate status. Like other sources of error, these can range from the
innocent to blatant. For example, the custodial parent in a married couple
that separates but does not get a divorce should, in some cases, ﬁle a joint
or married-ﬁling-separate return rather than ﬁle as a head of household,
where they may be more likely to be eligible for the credit.17Only the savvi-
est taxpayers would likely understand these rules.
Several EITC changes since the 1999 compliance study may have bene-
ﬁcial eﬀects on EITC compliance. One that has already been mentioned is
the change to the AGI tiebreaker test.18 Another initiative was put in place
as part of the 1997 budget agreement, in which Congress directed the sec-
retaries of the Treasury and Health and Human Services to jointly use the
Federal Case Registry (FCR) of Child Support Orders to improve the ac-
curacy of EITC claims. The FCR typically identiﬁes a child, the custodial
parent, and a noncustodial parent. Since a large fraction of EITC errors
arise in cases where someone other than the person living with the child is
claiming the child for EITC purposes, the FCR has the potential to allow
the IRS to identify a substantial number of noncompliant cases, where pre-
viously they had no useful information to scrutinize residence claims about
EITC-qualifying children. It is too early to know whether the FCR’s ap-
parent potential can be realized, although the system will be used by the
IRS to target prerefund audits in 2002 and Congress has given the IRS au-
thority to treat an EITC claim by a noncustodial parent as a “math error”
during return processing beginning in 2004.19
The rate of EITC noncompliance appears higher than the overall U.S.
tax gap, where it is estimated that 17 percent of total taxes are not paid (In-
ternal Revenue Service 1996).20 Although compliance appears to be very
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17. See Holtzblatt and Rebelein (1999, p. 8) for a discussion of the “abandoned spouses”
rules.
18. Income and foster child deﬁnitions have also been simpliﬁed.
19. Whereas the FCR would appear to be a promising compliance tool, the data in the reg-
istry could be low quality; living arrangements could be ﬂuid, making the FCR data insuﬃ-
ciently up-to-date; or it could be infeasible or ineﬃcient (from a cost-beneﬁt standpoint) to
use FCR data during processing to stop questionable refund claims before money is paid out.
Once inappropriate EITC claims are paid out, it is very diﬃcult to get the money back.
20. There is some question about the reliability of the tax gap estimates since the underlying
data are from 1988.high for wage and salary income, presumably because of third-party infor-
mation reporting, compliance rates on self-employment income, sales of
business property, certain types of capital income, and income earned in
the informal sector are comparable to and in some cases far worse than
EITC compliance rates.
3.3 Program Statistics
Table 3.3 provides information on the maximum real EITC beneﬁt (in
1999 dollars) over time, real expenditures, and caseloads since the credit was
established in 1975. For the ﬁrst sixteen years of the credit, the real value of
the maximum EITC never exceeded its 1975 value by more than $10. Real
spending on the credit increased sharply starting with the 1986 EITC ex-
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Table 3.3 Maximum Real EITC Credit, Real Spending, and Number of
Participants (in 1999 dollars)
Real Maximum Real EITC Spending Number of Claimants
Year EITC ($) ($ millions) (thousands)
1975 1,239 3,871 6,215
1976 1,171 3,792 6,473
1977 1,100 3,098 5,627
1978 1,022 2,678 5,192
1979 1,147 4,709 7,135
1980 1,011 4,015 6,954
1981 916 3,504 6,717
1982 863 3,064 6,395
1983 836 3,002 7,368
1984 802 2,626 6,376
1985 852 3,233 7,432
1986 836 3,054 7,156
1987 1,248 4,973 8,738
1988 1,231 8,303 11,148
1989 1,223 8,861 11,696
1990 1,215 9,614 12,542
1991 1,511 13,584 13,665
1992 1,643 15,470 14,097
1993 1,742 17,913 15,117
1994 2,842 23,725 19,017
1995 3,400 28,374 19,334
1996 3,776 30,607 19,464
1997 3,795 31,800 19,490
1998 3,839 31,959 19,516
1999 3,816 32,270 19,419
2000 3,762 31,471 19,363
Source:U.S. House of Representatives (1998) and general IRS statistics of income data on in-
dividuals available at [http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/tax_stats/soi/ind_gss.html].
Note: The data reﬂect claims (allowed through math error processing) and do not reﬂect sub-
sequent IRS enforcement actions after math error processing.pansion. Prior to 1986, the EITC cost between $2.6 and $4.7 billion. The
1986 expansion roughly doubled total spending on the credit by increasing
the maximum credit (to make up for the loss in the value of the credit due to
inﬂation), indexing the credit, and extending its phaseout range. The credit
rate, maximum credit, and spending increased every year from 1990
through 1996 as a consequence of the three-year phase-ins of the 1990 and
1993 EITC increases. Real EITC spending more than tripled in the 1990s.
The evolution of the number of EITC claimants shown in table 3.3
closely mirrors the changes in EITC statutes and, to a lesser extent, busi-
ness cycle changes. Between 5.2 and 7.4 million taxpayers claimed the
credit between 1975 and 1986. By extending EITC eligibility to taxpayers
with incomes up to an indexed level of $18,576 in 1988, the 1986 EITC
changes increased the number of EITC recipients by roughly 50 percent.
The phased-in 1990 expansions also modestly increased the income thresh-
olds that determine EITC eligibility, so the number of recipients increased
by roughly 1 million per year from 1990 to 1993. The number of claimants
increased by roughly 4 million as a consequence of the childless-worker
credit that became available for the ﬁrst time in 1994. Possibly due in part
to increased compliance eﬀorts, the number of EITC claimants has been
constant since 1995, despite the increasing labor force participation rate of
single-parent families.
It appears that the EITC reaches a large percentage of its intended ben-
eﬁciaries. Scholz (1994) used matched data from tax returns and the Sur-
vey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to calculate that 80 to 86
percent of taxpayers eligible for the EITC appeared to receive it in 1990.21
Developments since 1990 have an ambiguous eﬀect on EITC participation
rates. The maximum credit has increased sharply since then, from $1,215
to around $3,800 in 1999 dollars, and the credit extends further up in the
income distribution, where ﬁling propensities are high. The IRS, state
agencies, and nonproﬁt organizations have also expanded outreach eﬀorts.
However, there has been a steady increase in labor force participation of
single women with children (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000, 2001), and new
workers in this group presumably have lower ﬁling propensities than typi-
cal workers in the population. Hill et al. (1999), for example, suggest that
EITC participation rates for single mothers who recently had been on
AFDC in California were in the range of 42 to 54 percent in 1993 and 1994.
In addition, the IRS no longer will intervene (as it did until the early 1990s)
and award the credit when taxpayers ﬁle and appear eligible but do not take
the credit. Instead, the IRS sends a letter to taxpayers encouraging them to
consider ﬁling an amended return. EITC compliance eﬀorts may also have
discouraged some eligible taxpayers from claiming the credit.
The IRS (2002b) used data from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
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21. Blumenthal, Erard, and Ho (1999) present similar participation rates for 1988, making
use of detailed audit data from the 1988 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program.matched to tax returns and data from the SIPP for calendar year 1996 to
estimate that, of the households that appeared to be eligible for the EITC,
between 82.2 and 87.2 percent ﬁled tax returns and hence either claimed
the EITC or likely received a notice from the IRS telling them they may
have been eligible. These calculations suggest that the EITC changes be-
tween 1990 and 1996 had relatively little net eﬀect on EITC participation.
Liebman (2000) uses matched data from the 1990 CPS and tax returns to
examine the characteristics of EITC-eligible taxpayers. He writes (p. 1178):
50 percent of eligible 1990 EITC taxpayers are married, while 30 percent
are formerly married, and 20 percent have never been married. A little
more than half are white, a quarter are Black, and 18 percent are His-
panic. Of eligible EITC recipients, 74 percent have a high school educa-
tion or less; 44 percent live in the South; and 36 percent live in a central
city. Fifty-eight percent work 1500 hours or more, though this average is
brought down by married couples in which one spouse does not work.
Sixteen percent of eligible EITC tax returns are ﬁled by individuals in
households that receive welfare income during the year and 26 percent
are in households receiving food stamps.
It is diﬃcult to predict how the characteristics of EITC participants have
evolved between 1990 and now. The income threshold at which the EITC is
fully phased out has increased from $20,000 to over $30,000 (nominal) dol-
lars since 1990. Many taxpayers have incomes in that range, so it is likely
that EITC recipients appear somewhat more aﬄuent than what Liebman
found. At the same time, labor force participation rates of single women
with children have increased over this period, and many of these new work-
ers have low levels of human capital.
3.3.1 Antipoverty Eﬀects, Target Eﬃciency, Distributional Impact
The EITC was available in 2001 only to taxpayers with earned income
and adjusted gross income less than $32,121 if they had more than one
qualifying child, $28,281 if they had one qualifying child, and $10,708 if
they had no qualifying children. Scholz and Levine (2001) calculate that in
April 1997 over 60 percent of EITC payments went to taxpayers with pre-
EITC incomes below the poverty line and roughly half of total payments
directly reduced the poverty gap.22 Liebman (1997a) plots density func-
tions for EITC payments following the 1993 expansion that show a right-
skewed distribution, centered at roughly $13,000, with most payments go-
ing to families with incomes between $7,000 and $26,000.23
Figure 3.3 presents data from 1999 tax returns on the distribution of
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22. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services poverty guidelines for 2002 are
$8,860 for a one-person family, $11,940 for two-person families, $15,020 for three-person
families, and $18,100 for four-person families.
23. Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn (1996) compare the distributional eﬀects of the EITC
and minimum wage. They show the EITC is much more “target eﬃcient” than minimum wage
increases, if the objective of policy is to increase incomes of low-income workers.EITC returns and payments by adjusted gross income class for EITC
claimants with children. Roughly 23 percent of claimants are in the phase-
in range of the credit, and they receive 24 percent of total payments.
Roughly 19 percent are in the ﬂat range, and they receive 26 percent of to-
tal payments. The remaining 58 percent of claimants are in the phaseout
range of the credit; they receive roughly half of total payments. Of the 19.3
million total EITC claims in 1999, 3.2 million had no qualifying children
and claimed $0.6 billion, 7.8 million had one qualifying child and claimed
$12.0 billion, and 8.2 million had two or more and claimed $19.3 billion.
Data are not available for the distribution of EITC claims by ﬁling status.
Because the EITC is based on annual family income and not wages, it is
possible that people with high hourly wages who, for some reason or an-
other, choose to work relatively few annual hours could receive the credit.
In fact, the evidence suggests that in low-wage labor markets, incomes and
wages are tightly linked. Scholz (1996) describes tabulations from SIPP
showing that roughly two-thirds of EITC payments go to taxpayers with
wages in the bottom 25th percentile of all workers with children (below
$6.43 per hour) and more than 95 percent of all EITC beneﬁts are paid to
workers with wages below the median of $9.42 per hour. Liebman (1997a)
reports that in 1990, 75 percent of EITC recipients worked at least 1,000
hours and 60 percent worked more than 1,500 hours per year. Incomes and
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Fig. 3.3 Distribution of total EITC returns and EITC payments of families with
children, by AGI, 1999
Source: “Individual Income Tax Returns, 1999,” available at [http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/
display/0,,i1%3D40%26genericId%3D16882,00.html] (99INDTR.EXE, posted 28 January
2002), and authors’ calculations.wages are now even more tightly linked for EITC recipients since EITC-
eligible taxpayers cannot have more than $2,350 of capital (and net capital
gains) income.
Liebman (1997a) also presents calculations that provide an interesting
perspective on the importance of the EITC in low-wage labor markets. Be-
tween 1976 and 1996, the share of income received by the lowest ﬁfth of the
population fell from 4.4 percent to 3.7 percent. The share received by the
top 5 percent increased from 16.0 percent to 21.4 percent over that period.
Liebman’s calculations show that for households with children, the EITC
oﬀsets 29 percent of the decline in incomes in the 1st quintile of the popu-
lation and 9 percent of the decline in the 2nd quintile.
A more direct measure of the EITC’s importance is that in 1997 and 1998
it removed 4.3 million persons from poverty (Council of Economic Advis-
ers 1998, 2000). Recalling President Clinton’s antipoverty goal for the
EITC, a full-time (2,000 hours) minimum-wage worker heading a single-
parent, two-child family would earn $10,300 in wages and be eligible for a
$3,656 EITC in 1997. The poverty line for this family was $12,802.24 The
combination of full-time minimum wage work and the EITC for a family
of three in 1986 was $7,226, while the poverty line was $8,737. A full-time
minimum-wage worker receiving the EITC and heading a family of three
in 1975, the ﬁrst year of the EITC, would have had an income of $107 above
the poverty line of $4,293.
3.4 Review of Behavioral Issues
In this section we consider several conceptual issues related to the be-
havioral eﬀects of the EITC.
3.4.1 Program Participation: Claiming the EITC
Perhaps the most basic behavioral issue associated with the EITC is
whether eligible taxpayers actually ﬁle tax returns to receive it. At ﬁrst
glance the analytic underpinnings of this decision appear straightforward:
The beneﬁt of ﬁling for the credit is the dollar value of the EITC. The costs
include the transactions costs associated with ﬁling a return (for those who
would not otherwise ﬁle) and gathering the necessary information to claim
the EITC (or resources to pay a professional tax preparer). These cost-
beneﬁt considerations lead to straightforward implications. Claiming the
credit becomes more likely in cases where the potential credit is larger and
where the ﬁler’s familiarity with the program and the U.S. tax system is
greater.
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24. A married family with two children would have had an EITC and earnings of $13,956,
and the poverty line was $16,400. We look at 1997 since this is the most recent minimum wage
increase. Given the absence of minimum-wage indexing, full-time minimum-wage work sup-
plemented by the EITC after 1997 will be a smaller percentage of the poverty line than in 1997.From the work of Holtzblatt (1991), McCubbin (2000), and others, how-
ever, we know that a signiﬁcant fraction of taxpayers receive the EITC
when they are not technically eligible. Thus, a focus on participation
among eligibles may, in some circumstances, be too narrow. For policy-
makers and scholars interested in overall EITC participation, participa-
tion and compliance issues are intertwined. Even when thinking about par-
ticipation of eligibles, participation and compliance are linked, since
legitimate current-year claims, for example, may lead to scrutiny of past
tax returns or the possibility that funds may be garnished to cover de-
faulted student loans, past taxes, or child support.
Compliance issues can usefully be thought of in the classic tax evasion
framework of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Taxpayers will adopt an op-
timal reporting strategy, weighing the trade-oﬀ between the return to mis-
reporting a dollar of income and the corresponding increased risks of de-
tection and penalty. Interestingly for the case of the EITC, some taxpayers
may gain by overreporting income, a situation the IRS has little experience
with.25Also, unlike the classic tax evasion model that focuses on income re-
porting, a central issue with EITC noncompliance has to do with the resi-
dence of the qualifying child. The IRS (until recently, perhaps) has had
little information with which to examine these claims.
3.4.2 The Decision to Work and Hours of Work
As noted in both the introduction and the political history of the EITC,
one of the arguments frequently given for the EITC is that it provides
stronger work incentives than the NIT or entitlement programs like
AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid. This assessment, although true in a
comparative sense, obscures a complicated set of work and labor supply in-
centives created by the EITC for diﬀerent household structures and indi-
viduals at diﬀerent parts of the income distribution. As a result of these
complicated incentives, the overall eﬀect of the EITC on hours of work is
ambiguous.
The simplest framework in which to consider the work incentive eﬀects
of the EITC is the static labor-leisure model displayed in ﬁgure 3.4. In
thisstylized setting, the EITC creates, for eligible households, an expanded
budget constraint, shifting out the constraint from ade to abcde. The
phase-in region is represented by the segment ab, the ﬂat region by bc, and
the phaseout region by cd. Consider the implications for individuals who
do not work, whose well-being is indexed by utility level, UI
0, in the absence
of the EITC. As illustrated in ﬁgure 3.4, the introduction of the EITC in-
duces such individuals to enter the labor force and work, and their utility
increases to UI
1 from UI
0. The EITC creates an incentive for these non-
workers to enter the labor force since it increases the marginal value of
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25. Steuerle (1991) has referred to this phenomenon as the “superterranean economy.”working by raising the eﬀective wage. More formally, the rise in the eﬀec-
tive wage rate due to the EITC for individuals initially out of the labor force
results in only a positive substitution eﬀect and no income eﬀect.
Figure 3.4 also displays preferences for two additional types of individ-
uals, indexed by II and III, who, in the absence of the EITC (or other so-
cial programs), would participate in the labor force. As can be seen, the in-
troduction of an EITC program does not alter their decision to work.
Thus, the incentive eﬀects of the EITC with respect to labor force partici-
pation are unambiguously positive: The EITC will encourage some work-
ers to enter the labor force and should not induce individuals, low-skilled
or otherwise, to leave it. This result stands in contrast to the labor force
participation predictions that arise with programs related to the NIT (like
AFDC), where a guaranteed beneﬁt at zero hours of work creates incen-
tives for some people to leave the labor force.
At the same time, the predicted eﬀect of an EITC from the simple static
labor-leisure model on the extentof work (i.e., number of hours of work) is
ambiguous. As ﬁgure 3.4 illustrates, this is because of the diﬀerential
eﬀects that the credit has in its ﬂat and phaseout regions. The EITC struc-
ture implies diﬀerent marginal returns to work (i.e., eﬀective marginal
wage rates) for diﬀerent parts of the preprogram income distribution. For
type II individuals, who would participate in the labor force in the absence
of the EITC, the introduction of the EITC does not change the value of
their time in the labor market and only alters the income they can receive
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Fig. 3.4 Eﬀects of the EITC on labor force participation and hours of workthrough the tax credit. Thus, there is only an income eﬀect associated with
the introduction of the EITC for type II individuals. Whether this income
eﬀect is negative (leisure is a normal good) or positive is not clear a priori.
The empirical evidence on income eﬀects associated with labor supply de-
cisions suggests that leisure is a normal good, so, as illustrated in ﬁgure 3.4,
the EITC may result in a reduction of hours of work for this type of indi-
vidual.
The phaseout region of the EITC is relevant for the type III individuals
in ﬁgure 3.4. These individuals, as drawn, have an incentive to reduce their
hours of work enough so that they actually receive a credit. This ﬁnal case
illustrates the potentially negative eﬀect on hours that is generated in the
phaseout region of the EITC. There the EITC implies a lowereﬀective wage
rate relative to the absence of the EITC, which, by itself, results in a nega-
tive substitution eﬀect. In addition, there is an income eﬀect that, if nega-
tive, will lead to a further reduction in hours of work.
The above considerations suggest that the consequences of the EITC ex-
pansions for aﬀecting the work behavior of low-income workers are more
complicated than the commonly held view that the EITC is prowork. In
particular, the labor market eﬀects of the credit depend on the distribution
of taxpayers within the credit’s ranges and the degree to which people in
and out of the labor market respond to incentives. On the former issue, as
noted earlier, around 77 percent of EITC recipients will have incomes that
fall in the ﬂat or phaseout range of the credit, which raises the concern that
the EITC may lead to a net reduction in the labor supplied by low-income
workers. The latter issue concerning the responsiveness to the “eﬀective”
wage and income changes associated with the EITC expansions also can-
not be resolved a priori. It is an empirical matter. Below, we discuss the em-
pirical evidence to date on the magnitudes of these eﬀects.
The simple model illustrated in ﬁgure 3.4 focuses on the behavioral
eﬀects for individuals and ignores an important feature of the U.S. tax code
applicable to the EITC. Married couples generally ﬁle joint tax returns
and, thus, the AGI subject to taxes depends on their combined income and
not the separate incomes of each spouse. The fact that families, rather than
individuals, are the unit of analysis for the tax system has consequences for
the eﬀective wage rates of secondary earners, which is an issue made even
more important by the EITC. To see this, consider the following example
discussed in Eissa and Hoynes (1998).
Suppose that the husband earns $11,650 (in 1997) and that the couple
makes its time allocation decisions sequentially, with the wife taking ac-
tions under the assumption that her husband’s income is given. In this case,
the family will receive the maximum credit of $3,656 (assuming the couple
has two children) if the wife does not participate in the labor force. If she
does participate, the family’s credit, at the margin, will be reduced by $0.21
and that dollar will be subject to the Social Security payroll tax of $0.142
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35 percent; that is, her eﬀective wage rate will be only 65 percent of her
gross wage rate.
This lowering of the wife’s eﬀective wage provides an incentive for the
wife not to participate in the labor force, even though the presence of an
EITC might induce her husband to enter the labor force. Furthermore, if
she works, she has an incentive to reduce her hours of work in the presence
of the EITC (compared to no EITC) due to lowering of her eﬀective wage
(inducing a substitution eﬀect) and to the higher income the family re-
ceives from the EITC (inducing an income eﬀect). Note that the ambigu-
ous eﬀect of the EITC on the labor force participation choice of one of the
spouses does not hinge on the sequential decision-making assumption
noted above. Under a more general model of joint decision-making, the
greater the disparity in the gross wage rates and/or tastes for nonwork time
across spouses, the greater the incentive for an expansion of the EITC to
induce one of the spouses to not participate in the labor force. Again, the
importance of this potential work disincentive eﬀect of the EITC depends
on the magnitudes of the labor supply and labor force participation wage
elasticities of husbands and wives, on the degree to which people correctly
perceive tax incentives, and on the distributions of their wage rates relative
to the phase-in, ﬂat, and phaseout regions of the EITC. We examine em-
pirical evidence on the labor force participation and labor supply eﬀects of
the EITC for married couples below.
3.4.3 Marriage and Fertility
The previous discussion of the potential for diﬀerential eﬀects of the
EITC by marital status raises an important issue about the potential eﬀects
of the EITC on family structure. As noted above, the tax treatment of mar-
ried couples is diﬀerent from that of single parents or individuals, which
leads to situations where a married couple may face larger total tax liabili-
ties than they would pay if they separated. Similarly, two unmarried people
may pay lower taxes than they would if they got married. This is the well-
known “marriage penalty” that has been the focus of attention in the
public ﬁnance literature and policy circles.26In practice, marriage penalties
tend to accrue to two-earner couples if both partners have similar earnings,
and marriage bonuses tend to accrue to couples if the partners have dis-
parate earnings or only one earner. Two recent studies have suggested that
the EITC and its expansions over the last ten years are an important con-
tributing source of the marriage penalty (see Dickert-Conlin and Houser
1998 and Holtzblatt and Rebelein 1999). For example, Holtzblatt and
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26. See Feenberg and Rosen (1995), Alm and Whittington (1995), U.S. Congressional Bud-
get Oﬃce (1997), and Bull et al. (1999). The general statement of the problem is that the tax
system cannot simultaneously be progressive, treat the family as the unit of taxation, and be
neutral with respect to marriage.Rebelein (1999) estimated that the EITC increased the net marriage penal-
ties in the individual income tax by between $3.6 and $9.9 billion in 2000,
depending on the speciﬁc assumptions, and that these EITC-related net
penalties accounted for 10.0 to 31.7 percent of the total net projected mar-
riage penalties.
A natural question to ask is whether changes in the EITC are likely to
aﬀect rates of marriage and divorce among the poor. That is, the EITC may
decrease the incentive for single parents to marry by providing resources to
families with children. The credit also provides fairly substantial incentives
for some people to marry and others to separate or not marry. This poten-
tial for the EITC to inﬂuence marital status is reminiscent of the concerns
about the eﬀects of other public assistance programs, most notably the
AFDC program, on marriage and the incidence of female headship.27 To
date, much less attention has been paid in the literature to the impacts of
the EITC on marital status than to those of other assistance programs.
A related question arises as to whether the structure of the EITC also
may aﬀect the fertility decisions of households. As noted in section 3.2, the
EITC was only available to families with children prior to 1994, and, even
now, the maximum credit available to families with children is much larger
than that available to childless taxpayers. In addition, households with two
or more children were able to claim a higher EITC than households with
only one child, starting in 1991. Both of these EITC features constitute a
modest pronatalist incentive for taxpayers. There is a substantial literature
that examines the eﬀects of AFDC on fertility, especially on out-of-
wedlock births.28 Furthermore, studies have found nonnegligible eﬀects of
provisions of the tax code, namely the presence and generosity of the de-
pendent exemptions, on fertility and the timing of birth (see Whittington,
Alm, and Peters 1990 and Dickert-Conlin and Chandra 1999).
There is no direct empirical evidence on whether EITC fertility incen-
tives have actually inﬂuenced behavior. The question, however, is impor-
tant for two reasons. First, the eﬀects of policy on fertility are of general
interest as part of an eﬀort to assess the potential for unintended conse-
quences of tax policy. Second, many of the methods used by researchers to
isolate the eﬀects of the EITC on other behaviors, especially labor supply,
hinge crucially on the assumption that the EITC expansions have had no
eﬀects on the fertility of couples. We return to this issue below.
3.4.4 Consumption Behavior and Income Smoothing
The fundamental tenet of the life-cycle consumption model is that util-
ity-maximizing households will vary their consumption and saving so as to
164 V. Joseph Hotz and John Karl Scholz
27. See Moﬃtt (1998) for a discussion of this issue and a summary of the empirical evidence
on it.
28. Again, see Moﬃtt (1998) for a summary of that literature and its ﬁndings.equate the marginal utility of consumption across periods. To do this, fam-
ilies typically save in periods when income is unusually high and borrow
when income is unusually low. Families eligible for the EITC generally have
lower incomes and are younger than other taxpayers. Thus, one would ex-
pect EITC-eligible households to include many who would like to borrow.
There is evidence, however, that some of these families that would like to
borrow are unable to do so.29 For these liquidity-constrained families, the
EITC could enhance utility more than it would for an otherwise equivalent
consumer who was not liquidity-constrained. The EITC advance payment
option might seem like a particularly important feature for credit-
constrained taxpayers. By delivering a portion of the EITC incrementally
with every paycheck, it presumably oﬀers families an enhanced ability to
smooth the marginal utility of consumption.30 As we discuss below, how-
ever, only 1.1 percent of EITC recipients took advantage of the advance
payment option in 1998, although “refund anticipation loans” (with very
high implied interest rates) are popular.
Further evidence of credit constraints among the EITC-eligible popula-
tion might be inferred from unusual patterns of seasonality in consump-
tion. In particular, most EITC payments are received in February and
March of each year (Barrow and McGranahan 2000). Since these pay-
ments can be a large fraction of a family’s quarterly income, one might ex-
pect to see a corresponding increase in consumption for credit-constrained
families. Souleles (1999), for example, presents evidence based on con-
sumption Euler equations for the entire population that is consistent with
tax refunds’ inﬂuencing the seasonality of consumption, which in turn is
consistent with the existence of liquidity-constrained consumers.
Consumption-related issues also arise if one steps away from the canon-
ical life-cycle model of consumption. Thaler (1994) and others have argued
that self-control problems are pervasive in the economy. If rules of thumb,
habit, innumeracy, or other psychological factors have a dominant in-
ﬂuence on economic behavior, the forward-looking model of utility-
maximizing consumers may not do a particularly good job of characteriz-
ing economic behavior. In this case, it is possible that self-control problems
or other factors prevent families from accumulating resources that might
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29. Jappelli (1990) looks at direct measures from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances
and ﬁnds that roughly 20 percent of the population appears to be constrained. Also see Jap-
pelli, Pischke, and Souleles (1998).
30. Taxpayers can receive a portion of their EITC incrementally throughout the year via
the advance payment option. They do this by ﬁling Form W-5 with their employers, who then
include the advance payment in their regular paycheck (the employers are held harmless be-
cause they reduce payroll tax remittances to the government). To reduce the possibility that
advanced EITC payments will lead to an end-of-year tax liability, advance payments are lim-
ited to 60 percent of the maximum credit available to families with one child. Taxpayers re-
ceiving the advance payment are obligated to ﬁle at the end of the year to reconcile their tax
liabilities.allow them to enhance their long-run economic well-being. The lump-sum
EITC may therefore provide a substantial one-time payment that can be
used to purchase a car, enhance human capital, or move out of an unde-
sirable neighborhood (and in doing so break a cycle of economic depriva-
tion). It is diﬃcult to develop and test rigorous formulations of nonopti-
mizing consumption behavior.
3.5 Review of Evidence on the Behavioral Eﬀects of the EITC
In this section, we summarize the empirical evidence concerning the
eﬀects of changes in the EITC on a range of behavioral outcomes. We be-
gin by discussing empirical studies of EITC take-up (or participation) de-
cisions and what is known about the extent of noncompliance in actual
claims of the credit. We then summarize the literature on the eﬀects of the
EITC expansions on labor force behavior, including labor force participa-
tion and labor supply decisions. Most of the empirical investigations of the
EITC have focused on the latter set of behaviors. We discuss the econo-
metric approaches taken in these studies and consider their potential
shortcomings. We then provide a summary of the less extensive literature
on the eﬀects of the EITC on other behaviors, including marriage and liv-
ing arrangements, human capital investment decisions, and consumption
decisions, commenting on the importance of expanding on these studies in
future work.
3.5.1 Evidence on EITC Participation and Noncompliance
It would be helpful to policymakers to know what fraction of EITC non-
participation (among eligible taxpayers) is due to information barriers and
what fraction is due to purposeful nonparticipation. The decision of indi-
viduals or households to participate in the EITC entails at least two
choices: Households must work and have income below the EITC break-
even thresholds, and households must ﬁle a tax return to claim the credit.
As mentioned in section 3.4, there are three studies of EITC participa-
tion among eligibles: Scholz (1994) for 1990; Blumenthal, Erard, and Ho
(1999) for tax year 1988; and IRS (2002b) for tax year 1996. None of the
studies model the EITC participation decision based a formal optimizing
model. Scholz (1994) presents reduced-form regressions of factors corre-
lated with nonparticipation. He ﬁnds some evidence, based on his analysis
of linked data from the 1990 SIPP and tax returns, that factors like work-
ing in the household service sector or being eligible for a small EITC were
positively correlated with not claiming the credit when eligible. The ques-
tion is still open, however, about the degree to which EITC participation
can be increased by additional outreach and information.
Formally modeling the decision to claim the EITC will require one to
confront several information and noncompliance issues. There is mixed
166 V. Joseph Hotz and John Karl Scholzanecdotal evidence on the degree to which taxpayers are aware of the
EITC.31 The only systematic evidence comes from Phillips (2001), who
presents tabulations from the 1999 National Survey of America’s Families
showing that roughly two-thirds of Americans have heard about the EITC.
Past welfare recipients and parents with incomes near the poverty line were
among the most knowledgeable.
The degree of awareness of the credit is critical for some issues and less
important for others. The credit could, for example, signiﬁcantly increase
labor force participation even if people know little about it as long as work-
ers have some understanding that the tax system rewards work at low lev-
els of earnings. The link between the marginal incentives of the credit
shown in ﬁgure 3.2 and the labor supply decisions discussed in ﬁgure 3.4
depends on people understanding the speciﬁc incentives inherent in the
credit’s structure. Given the lag between labor market decisions and receipt
of the credit, which can be as much as sixteen months, informational con-
siderations suggest that the credit’s eﬀect on participation may be larger
than its eﬀect on hours, compared to a world where taxpayers have perfect
knowledge of the credit.
Informational issues are probably less fundamental when thinking
about EITC participation among taxpayers eligible for the credit. Scholz
(1997) reports that roughly 95 percent of EITC claimants are either legally
required to ﬁle tax returns or would ﬁle to recover overwithheld taxes, so
most eligible taxpayers would get into the system even in the absence of the
EITC. In 1996, 56.5 percent of claimants used paid tax preparers, who
surely are aware of the credit. The IRS also has a policy of notifying all tax-
payers who do not claim the credit but appear to be eligible for it based on
their ﬁling information that they may be eligible and can ﬁle an amended
return to claim the credit.
Behavioral work on overall EITC participation and noncompliance
must take into consideration three central facts. First, there appears to be
little scope for overstating EITC claims by systematic, ongoing misreport-
ing of wage and salary income. The IRS, using information returns ﬁled by
employers, can in principle corroborate wage and salary reports.32
Second, there appear to be ample opportunities to misreport self-
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31. Liebman (1997a) suggests that awareness of the credit might be quite low. Smeeding,
Ross-Philips, and O’Connor (2000) and Romich and Weisner (2000) ﬁnd greater awareness,
although the former study is based on a sample seeking help with tax preparation and the lat-
ter is based on a small sample from Project New Hope, a work-based welfare reform project
in Milwaukee.
32. The IRS (1996) reports that, in aggregate, net underreporting on wage and salary in-
come was 0.9 percent, lower than any items other than state tax refunds (at 0.8 percent). Wage
and salary errors related to EITC can still occur because claimants may not realize that em-
ployers provide independent information to the IRS, may unintentionally omit a Form W-2
for a second job, may wish to use the IRS as a “loan shark” for the period between submit-
ting a claim and being audited (Andreoni 1992), or may wish to take the chance that the IRS
will be unable to recover money once it is paid out (and spent).employment income to strategically manipulate the size of the available
EITC, since most forms of self-employment do not include information re-
porting. McCubbin (2000), however, reports that only a small fraction of
EITC noncompliance in 1994 involved self-employment income. In addi-
tion, only 17.6 percent of all EITC ﬁlers claim any self-employment in-
come, and 54.3 percent of those reporting self-employment income have
incomes in the phaseout range of the credit (IRS 1999), so it appears that
strategic misreporting of self-employment income is not currently a domi-
nant feature of EITC noncompliance. Perhaps this is because EITC in-
centives can be complicated for those wishing to strategically manipulate
self-employment income. To be eﬀective, would-be tax cheats need to be
sophisticated enough to overstate self-employment income in the phase-in
range of the credit or understate self-employment income in the phase-out
range.
Third, as pointed out by Liebman (1997a, 2000) and McCubbin (2000),
among others, the major area of EITC noncompliance—particularly par-
ticipation by ineligibles—has to do with qualifying-child errors. This is a
particularly diﬃcult area for the IRS to enforce, since information on chil-
dren (beyond ages and Social Security numbers) is not collected in the tax
system.33 Liebman (1997b) develops the following intuitive idea: If non-
compliance is inadvertent, it should not respond to the size of the available
credit. He examines this by looking at whether the probability of erro-
neously claiming a dependent child depends on the tax gain to such a claim
(McCubbin 2000 pursues a similar strategy). He estimates that roughly one-
third of ineligible claimants in 1988 did so in response to the EITC incentive.
Good compliance studies will be diﬃcult to conduct outside of the Trea-
sury, IRS, or Census Bureau because of data-access limitations. An inter-
esting question for public servants and aﬃliated scholars at these agencies
is whether data gathered for one purpose—for example, administering
child support laws—could be useful in reducing erroneous EITC claims.
To be useful for tax administration, ways to identify erroneous payments
before money goes out must be developed, since once payments are made
they are rarely recovered. In addition, the IRS has limited resources, so re-
search is also needed on the cost-eﬀectiveness of alternative ways of im-
proving compliance, focusing on both the EITC and the broader tax sys-
tem. Although EITC compliance has received considerable scrutiny in
recent years, comparable work on other areas of the tax code is badly dated
or nonexistent.
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33. Despite some evidence that error rates are high for certain subgroups—for example,
Liebman (2000) reports that roughly one-third of male heads of households did not appear
to have children in matched CPS data—audits are expensive, so “hit rates” need to be much
higher than one in three for compliance initiatives to pass any sensible cost-beneﬁt test. The
U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce (2000), for example, reports that 86 percent of EITC claims
selected for audit in ﬁscal year 1999 were, in fact, noncompliant.New studies documenting changes in EITC participation rates of eligi-
ble taxpayers in the late 1990s are needed, given the sharp changes in the
credit over the decade and changes in low-wage labor markets. Greater de-
tail on the characteristics of nonparticipants would also be useful, both for
outreach and for understanding linkages between programs. These studies
would be straightforward, although in order to do them, data rich enough
to determine eligibility need to be linked with data indicating whether or
not a potentially eligible taxpayer ﬁles a return and receives the credit.
3.5.2 Eﬀects of EITC on Labor Force Participation and Labor Supply
Most of the existing empirical investigations have focused on the conse-
quences of the expansion of the EITC for labor force participation rates
and hours of work. Most of these studies have sought to estimate the over-
all, or “reduced-form,” eﬀects of the historical expansions of this program
on these labor market outcomes. Another strand of these studies focuses
on estimating the eﬀects of the EITC with now-standard labor supply mod-
els by exploiting the fact that the EITC expansions have varied the eﬀective
wages and incomes confronting individuals and households over the last
twenty-ﬁve years. We also provide a brief discussion of the evidence de-
rived from more structural optimizing models of time allocation and pro-
gram participation decisions in which household preferences and budget
and time constraints are explicitly parameterized.
Reduced-Form Eﬀects of EITC
Reduced-form studies typically exploit statutory EITC changes to assess
their eﬀects on behavior. This approach is a time-honored strategy in pol-
icy analysis and applied economics, and it is often referred to as “natural
experiments” or “diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences.”34
Consider the following framework to help clarify the underlying identi-
ﬁcation issues. Suppose we are interested in estimating the eﬀect of a pol-
icy (or bundle of policies) on some outcome, y. In most of the reduced-
form studies of the EITC, the identifying variation used comes from the
periodic legislative expansions and other changes in the credit. For ex-
ample, Eissa and Liebman (1996) study the eﬀects of the changes in the
EITC contained in the TRA86. Furthermore, as noted above, these
changes were not always applicable to everyone in the population. Prior to
1994, childless adults were not eligible to claim the EITC and adults with
qualifying children were eligible for the same schedule of credits, whereas,
starting in 1994, childless adults were eligible and adults with two or more
children were eligible for a more generous credit than adults with only one
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34. The following discussion draws heavily on Moﬃtt and Wilhelm (2000). Also see Blun-
dell and MaCurdy (1999), Meyer (1995), and Angrist and Krueger (1999) for other discus-
sions of approaches to estimating the eﬀects of policy interventions.child. To characterize these sources of policy variation, let dt(Qit) denote
the EITC regime prevailing as of period t, where the particular features of
the EITC code applicable to the ith individual or household depend on
their characteristics, Qit (e.g., presence and number of children). That is:
(1) dt(Qit)   
Finally, consider the following linear speciﬁcation of the determinants of
behavioral outcomes, y it, such as labor force participation or hours of
work,
(2) y it    dt(Qit)    tXit    t   uit,
where Xit is a vector of individual and household characteristics that may
include Qit, uit is an error term, and  ,  t, and  t are parameters to be esti-
mated.
To understand what is required to identify  , the overall eﬀect of the pol-
icy change, consider what would be learned if one could assign the values
of dt(Qit) by a controlled experiment, where some individuals (experimen-
tals) would face a new policy regime [dt(Qit)   1] and others (controls)
would not have access to this new regime [dt(Qit)   0]. It would follow, by
design, that dt(Qit) would be uncorrelated with (orthogonal to) uit and, for
that matter, to Xit. In this case, the standard conditions for consistently es-
timating the parameters in equation (2) would apply. In fact, in this case,
the mean diﬀerence in outcomes for experimentals and controls would
consistently estimate  .
In the absence of random assignment of individuals to policy regimes,
we must rely on temporal changes (or, possibly, locational diﬀerences) in
policies and/orvariation in dt(Qit) due to individual diﬀerences in Qit. How-
ever, these sources of variation, in general, are not suﬃcient for identifying
 . For example, reliance only on the changes in the EITC over time to iden-
tify the credit’s eﬀect is confounded with other temporal changes in the
economy (or environment) that may have inﬂuenced the labor supply of
the low-income population. Thus, additional assumptions, in conjunction
with the availability of certain types of data, are required in order to iden-
tify the eﬀects of the EITC. Existing studies of the EITC, and studies of re-
lated tax and public assistance policy changes, make use of alternative data
sources and assumptions.
Suppose dt is deﬁned as in equation (1) and assume we have data, either
repeated cross-section or panel data, on households for periods t  and t ,
where t  denotes a period before an EITC expansion and t  is a period af-
ter the expansion. Furthermore, recall that prior to 1994 the EITC re-
quired claimants to have children present to be eligible for the credit. This
implies that households without children both before and after EITC ex-
pansions (such as occurred in 1986) were not eligible for the EITC, whereas
1 if individual i is eligible for a policy reform that
prevails in period t, 0 otherwise
170 V. Joseph Hotz and John Karl Scholzhouseholds with children faced a change in the credit with the expansion.
In this case Qit can be represented as an indicator variable, where Qit   1 if
children are present in household i and in period t and 0 if not, and dt(0)  
0 for t  and t . The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator of   results from di-
ﬀerencing equation (2) for periods t  and t  for each individual/household:
(3) y it    y it     [dt (Qit )   dt (Qit )]    t Xit     t Xit    (uit    uit ).
The validity of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator for  relies on sev-
eral additional assumptions about Qit and its eﬀects on y in equation (2).
The ﬁrst concerns the nature of independent eﬀects of Qit on y. Recall that
we allowed for the possibility that Xit includes Qit. In the current context,
this amounts to assuming that the presence of children aﬀects the labor
supply decisions of parents, an assumption consistent with various behav-
ioral models of optimal time allocation.35 The standard diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimator maintains either the assumption that Qit is excluded
from Xit or the less restrictive, but not innocuous, assumption that  t    ,
that is, the eﬀect of children on ydoes not vary with time. Second, the stan-
dard diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator typically assumes that Qit is un-
correlated with uitin equation (2). Note that strict exogeneity of Qitin equa-
tion (2) is not required. The consistency of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimator holds under weaker assumptions, especially if one is willing to
maintain that Qit is a time-invariant variable. (See Moﬃtt and Wilhelm
2000 for details.) Under these two sets of assumptions, the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimator of   will be consistent.
As noted earlier, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences studies rely on explicit
comparisons between groups that are and are not aﬀected by changes in
the EITC. Figure 3.5 plots trends in the labor force participation between
1984 and 1996 (from the March CPS, taken from Meyer and Rosenbaum
2000) for six groups in the population—including households with and
without children—that are commonly used to examine the eﬀects of the
EITC. It is these trends that the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences studies of labor
force participation seek to explain.
It is clear from ﬁgure 3.5 that labor force participation of three groups
commonly used as controls has no discernible trends. Single women with
no children and black men, the top two lines in the ﬁgure, have high and
unchanging rates of labor force participation. Single women who dropped
out of high school but have no children also have steady (or even declining)
rates of labor force participation. The three groups of women eligible for
the EITC all had rising rates of labor force participation, particularly after
1992. These are all single women with children, single women who dropped
out of high school and have children, and single women with children un-
der six.
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35. See Browning (1992) for a discussion of such models and the eﬀects of children.Selected EITC studies of the estimated impacts of the EITC on labor
force participation and hours of work are summarized in table 3.4.We ﬁrst
discuss papers adopting the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach.
Eissa and Liebman (1996) estimate the eﬀects of the 1986 EITC expan-
sion on labor force participation of single women and, conditional on
working, their hours of work. To isolate those aﬀected by the policy from
those who are not, they treat single women with children as being in the
experimental group and single women without children as being in the
control group. They ﬁnd that the 1986 tax reform (including the EITC
changes) increased labor force participation among all single women with
children by as much as 2.8 percentage points (from a base of 74.2 percent).
The eﬀects are much larger (on the order of 6 percentage points) for women
with children and less than a high school education.
Eissa and Hoynes (1998) use a similar diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estima-
tor to examine the EITC’s labor market eﬀects on couples, in addition to
an alternative quasi-structural approach discussed below. Recall that the
EITC would be expected to have negative labor market eﬀects for second-
ary workers. They ﬁnd modest negative eﬀects of the EITC on married
women’s labor force participation, estimating that the EITC expansions
172 V. Joseph Hotz and John Karl Scholz


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.between 1984 and 1996 reduced the likelihood of labor market participa-
tion by around 1.2 percentage points (or 2 percent).
Ellwood (2000) exploits the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach in which
he classiﬁes parents according to their position in the distribution of pre-
dicted wages, comparing women in the lowest (predicted) wage quartile
with those in higher quartiles to distinguish groups that are likely to be
aﬀected by the EITC (the lowest quartile) from those that are not (the
higher quartiles). He concludes that it is “perilous to impossible” to de-
compose the relative impacts of welfare reform, the strong economy, and
EITC changes in the 1990s on the labor force participation patterns of low-
skilled workers, but notes that the combination has led to a “truly un-
precedented increase in labor market activity by low-income single par-
ents” (p. 1100).36
To the extent that changes in policies other than the EITC or other “en-
vironmental” factors are coincident with the EITC expansions, there is the
potential for bias in diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates. Many states, for
example, implemented changes in their welfare programs during the latter
part of the 1980s, including reducing the growth in guarantees and the im-
position and tightening of work rules for recipients (see Moﬃtt, chap. 5 in
this volume). Given the AFDC eligibility criteria, these changes are likely
to have diﬀerentially aﬀected single women with children relative to those
without children. Furthermore, there is potential for the composition of
the treatment and control groups in these studies to have changed over
time.37
These concerns are addressed by Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2002a), who
assess the employment eﬀects of the EITC changes in the 1990s using data
on a sample of families who received welfare beneﬁts in California during
the early part of the 1990s. Their study has four distinctive diﬀerences from
previous work. First, their sample is composed of former (or current) wel-
fare recipients, a more disadvantaged population than that examined in
other papers. Second, they used administrative data from the welfare, un-
employment insurance, and federal tax systems and focused on four coun-
ties in California that were part of a welfare demonstration (see Hotz,
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36. Neumark and Wascher (2001) examine correlations between income and income-to-
needs ratios and state and federal EITC parameters. They ﬁnd small eﬀects of the federal
EITC on earnings but large eﬀects of state EITCs. They emphasize the state-level results, but
variation in state EITC policy is somewhat limited in the years spanned by their data, so the
discrepancy is puzzling.
37. Ellwood (2000) raises similar concerns (with diﬀerent language), pointing out that with
comparisons of single women with and without children, one cannot disentangle the separate
eﬀect of policy changes and everything else going on in the economy. One can only hope to
test the overall impact of the combination of policies in a strong economy. He also notes that
the temporal pattern of labor force participation of the two groups is often diﬀerent before
the enactment of the EITC, so drawing inferences from diﬀerential trends afterwards is trou-
bling. Moreover, a large fraction of childless single women were already workers even before
EITC expansions, so their employment cannot grow much.Mullin, and Scholz 2002b for a more complete description). The data al-
low the authors to account more directly than other studies for potentially
confounding changes in local labor markets and welfare reform. Third, the
authors identify the employment eﬀects of the EITC by comparing fami-
lies with two or more children to families with one child, since after 1994
the EITC increased substantially for the former group relative to the latter.
They argue that this approach focuses on groups that are likely to be more
similar than studies that compare, for example, families with and without
children.
They ﬁnd that the EITC has large, positive eﬀects on employment of
adults from welfare families in California. Employment rates of families
with two or more children increased 6 to 8 percentage points more than the
employment rates of one-child families. The implied-elasticity of labor
force participation with respect to net income ranges from 0.97 to 1.69 de-
pending on assumptions used in the underlying elasticity calculations.
Most of this range exceeds the next highest estimate reported in table 3.4.
Larger elasticity estimates are consistent, however, with the previously
mentioned result for Eissa and Leibman (1996) for women with children
and less than a high school education. The fourth distinctive feature of the
Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz study is that through a special arrangement with
the California Franchise Tax Board, the authors were able to request
grouped tabulations from the federal tax returns ﬁled by the sample mem-
bers. If the EITC accounts for the relative employment increase of families
with two or more children, they should be ﬁling tax returns and claiming
the EITC at a signiﬁcantly greater rate than their one-child counterparts.
In fact, they do.
Estimates from the natural experiment (or diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences)
studies described above are limited in their ability to assess the eﬀects of al-
ternative EITC designs. As can be seen in table 3.1, all major expansions in
the EITC entailed simultaneous changes in EITC phase-in rates, phaseout
rates, and the maximum credit. In section 3.3, we noted that a simple labor-
leisure model predicts that households in the phaseout region of the credit
would reduce their labor supply in response to an increase in the phaseout
rate, all else being equal, while the eﬀect of increases in the phase-in rate on
hours of work depends on the relative strength of the substitution and in-
come eﬀects associated with this change. Determining the direction and
magnitude of the behavioral responses to changes in each of these param-
eters is useful for assessing the validity of this model and for assessing the
likely impacts of alternative designs of the EITC beyond those actually im-
plemented.
Eﬀects of the EITC Based with Standard Labor Supply Models
As noted above, several studies have analyzed the eﬀects of the EITC on
labor force participation and hours of work with standard labor supply
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tax rates that certain types of individuals and households face.38 The stud-
ies by Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1995); Eissa and Hoynes (1998); and
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) are based on this approach.39
Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1995) measure labor force participation
elasticities using data from the 1990 SIPP. They construct a detailed tax
and transfer simulation model that reﬂects precise estimates of state and
federal income taxes, payroll taxes, AFDC, food stamps, and Supplemen-
tal Security Income. The simulation model allows them to characterize the
enormous variation in budget sets that families face in diﬀerent states.
They use an instrumental variables approach (described presently), calcu-
lating the after-tax change in incomes that would result from taking a half-
time (and in some speciﬁcations, full-time) job at the predicted wage rela-
tive to being out of the labor market. The intuition underlying the study is
that in high-beneﬁt states (like New York at the time), the after-tax return
to work is fairly low since substantial beneﬁts are clawed back, while in
low-beneﬁt states (like Texas at the time), the after-tax return to work is
high since there are few beneﬁts to lose. Thus, if labor market participation
decisions are sensitive to the after-tax returns to work, participation rates
should be higher in low-beneﬁt states than in high-beneﬁt states, all else be-
ing equal.
Dickert, Houser, and Scholz ﬁnd that a 10 percent increase in the after-
tax wage results in a 2 percentage point (or 3.5 percent) increase in labor
market participation among single parents (they also jointly estimate a re-
duced-form equation for the welfare participation decision), which sug-
gests that EITC-induced changes in the returns to work increase labor
market participation. Their estimates also show that participation of sec-
ondary wage earners will fall as a consequence of the EITC. Their new em-
pirical work on participation, coupled with simulation work on the eﬀect
of the EITC on hours for those already in the labor market, suggests that
the aggregate positive participation eﬀects of the 1993 EITC expansions
likely outweighed the negative hours eﬀects, resulting in a net increase in
aggregate hours of work.
A potential problem with the Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1995) study
is that EITC eﬀects are inferred from correlations of employment with
other aspects of the tax and transfer system.40 Moreover, idiosyncratic
state-level factors correlated with family budget sets and labor market de-
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38. The approach builds on the neoclassical labor supply and labor force participation
models. See Pencavel (1986), Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), and Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999) for surveys of this work.
39. Also see the simulation studies of Hoﬀman and Seidman (1990); U.S. General Ac-
counting Oﬃce (1993); Holtzblatt, McCubbin, and Gillette (1994); and Browning (1995).
40. The data are a cross section and the EITC is a uniform federal program, so EITC eﬀects
are inferred from the cross-state variation in net wages generated by state-level diﬀerences in
tax and transfer rules.cisions could bias estimates. Hoynes (1997), for example, shows that in-
cluding state ﬁxed eﬀects can signiﬁcantly alter estimates of the eﬀects of
AFDC on female headship.
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) signiﬁcantly advance the literature in
their analysis of the eﬀects of the EITC and other policy changes on the la-
bor force participation of single women. They develop an econometric
model of labor force participation, calculating the probability that the util-
ity of working exceeds the utility associated with not working. That is, the
probability of working is given by
(4) Pr(U(Y w, Lw, P w, X, εw)   U(Y nw, Lnw, P nw, X, εnw))
where U(Y k, Lk, P k, X) are the indirect utility functions associated with the
work (w) and nonwork (nw) states, Y k is the income the woman receives in
the kth state, Lk is her leisure time in alternative states, P k denotes her par-
ticipation in welfare programs (to capture potential transaction costs and
stigma associated with participation in such programs), X denotes observ-
able characteristics, and εk represents unobserved, stochastic components
of tastes. The inﬂuence that the EITC and other programs have on wages
and income enters through the speciﬁcations of the incomes associated
with the work and nonwork states.
Meyer and Rosenbaum specify Y w and Y nw as functions of parameteriza-
tions of the EITC, federal and state tax rules, and the characteristics of
other welfare programs facing women at diﬀerent times and in diﬀerent
states, utilizing an exhaustive set of data on the tax structure and welfare
programs. Linearizing U( ) with respect to its arguments and using a non-
parametric strategy to calculate expected values of income associated with
the work state for women in their data, they use a probit speciﬁcation to es-
timate their labor force participation model.
They ﬁnd that EITC changes account for roughly 60 percent of the in-
crease in the employment rate of single mothers from 1984 to 1996 and
roughly 31 percent of the increase from 1992 to 1996. Given the changes in
employment rates and the size of the EITC changes over this period, their
results are broadly consistent with the earlier papers, although, as we show
in table 3.4, their estimated elasticities of labor force participation with re-
spect to net income are the smallest of the range of existing studies (al-
though all estimates are quite close, with the exception of the larger esti-
mate of Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz 2002a).
There are at least two notable features of Meyer and Rosenbaum’s work.
First, they account for EITC changes that occurred between 1984 and
1996, making use of time series variation in the credit to identify employ-
ment eﬀects. Second, they construct an elaborate simulation model of the
tax and transfer system that allows them to net out the inﬂuence of changes
in other policies, both over time and across place of residence. Dealing
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cially to the extent that such changes had diﬀerential impacts on house-
holds with and without children.
Structural Choice Models of Time Allocation and Program Participation
The nonlinear or kinked nature of the budget set induced by the EITC
program can result in nonmarginal changes in behavior that complicate
eﬀorts to rely on wage and income elasticities drawn from other econo-
metric studies. This can be seen in ﬁgure 3.4 for the type III individuals.
The optimal pre-EITC labor supply choice for a type III individual would
generate labor earnings that exceed the upper threshold for EITC eligibil-
ity. Because of the nonconvexity introduced with the EITC phaseout
range, one could observe individuals reducing their labor supply and earn-
ings so as to be eligible for a credit. Such nonconvexities in the phaseout re-
gion require one to know more than just the income and substitution
eﬀects in order to assess the response to EITC changes. It requires knowl-
edge of the underlying preferences for work versus leisure to determine
whether such behaviors are likely to occur.
The structural approach explicitly parameterizes the preferences and
constraints facing individuals and then exploits the theory of optimal de-
cision-making to characterize the likelihood function used to reconcile ob-
served labor supply and program participation behaviors. This approach is
exempliﬁed in the work of Hausman (1985) on the eﬀects of income tax
structure on the labor supply and Moﬃtt (1990) and Keane and Moﬃtt
(1998) in the study of the labor supply impacts of welfare and other social
programs.
Keane and Moﬃtt (1998) and Keane (1995; based on the Keane and
Moﬃtt model) use their model estimates to examine a wide range of policy
reforms, including changes to AFDC and food stamp tax rates, a variety of
wage and work subsidies, and changes to the EITC. Their EITC simula-
tions ﬁnd that the expansions between 1984 and 1996 increased labor force
participation by 10.7 percentage points, from a base of 65.4 percent. They
also ﬁnd that the aggregate eﬀect of the EITC expansions was to increase
hours of work. This paper is notable as the only EITC study to recover
underlying household preference parameters.
A study by Blundell et al. (2000) sought to estimate the likely impact of
alternative implementations of an EITC-like tax credit scheme in the
United Kingdom (called the Family Working Tax Credit) before it was ac-
tually implemented. This type of application is one of the most valuable
uses for structural estimates. In general, greater knowledge of the “struc-
ture” of individual and household preferences and their choice processes is
required to predict the behavioral responses to complicated, hypothetical
policy changes than is needed to assess the net impacts of straightforward,
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structural features of decision making is inherently more diﬃcult than es-
timating net eﬀects of observed expansions.
3.5.3 Estimates of the EITC and Hours of Work
Studies estimating the eﬀects of the EITC on hours of work for those
households that are working ﬁnd small, negative eﬀects. These studies are
summarized in the second panel of table 3.4. Liebman (1997a) ﬁnds no
bunching of taxpayers at the beginning and end of the phaseout range, as
might be expected if the EITC signiﬁcantly aﬀects hours and taxpayers are
cognizant of the discontinuities in implied marginal tax rates generated by
the credit. As Liebman notes, it is not surprising that negative eﬀects on
hours for people already in the labor market are small because the precise
relationship between the EITC and hours worked is likely to be poorly un-
derstood by most taxpayers. The majority of EITC recipients pay a third
party to prepare their tax returns, and it is diﬃcult to infer the implicit tax
rates embodied in the credit from the look-up table that accompanies the
EITC instructions. This confusion is less likely to mitigate positive partic-
ipation eﬀects, since for these to be operative, taxpayers only need to un-
derstand that there is some tax-related bonus to work. Abundant anec-
dotal evidence indicates that taxpayers have this understanding (see, e.g.,
Jason DeParle, “Once a Forlorn Avenue, Tax Preparers Now Flourish,”
New York Times, 21 March 1999).
The standard approach to estimating the eﬀects of policies on hours of
work is based on the labor supply equation that takes the following generic
form:
(5) h    0    1w∗    2Y∗    X   u,
given h 0, where his the number of hours worked, w∗is the eﬀective wage
rate, Y∗is the individual’s eﬀective nonlabor income, the Xs are again used
to capture observable diﬀerences, and u is an error term. The parameters
 1 and  2 in equation (5) represent the uncompensated wage eﬀect and in-
come eﬀect, respectively, and  1 –  2h0 represents the compensated wage,
or substitution, eﬀect, evaluated at some level of hours of work, h0. In the
context of estimating the eﬀects of taxes and other social programs on
hours of work, one crucial issue is how to deal with the potential endo-
geneity of w∗ and Y∗ when estimating  1 and  2. The endogeneity of eﬀec-
tive wages and incomes facing individuals arises because of the nonlinear-
ities in the budget sets in the presence of taxes and transfer programs that
individuals face. Even if before-tax and transfer wages and before-tax
sources of unearned income are assumed to be exogenous (and these are
controversial assumptions), eﬀective wages and income levels are pre-
sumed to be endogenous. This is due to the fact that individuals’ choice of
the segment of the budget constraint may depend upon their tastes and
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endogeneity bias in the estimation of  1 and  2. Such bias is likely to be
more problematic when individuals face nonconvex budget sets created,
for example, by the phaseout region of the EITC.
Several econometric strategies have been employed in an attempt to mit-
igate these biases. They diﬀer in the sources of variation they use to identify
the eﬀects of tax and transfer programs, the degree to which the estimates
can be used to estimate more general sets of counterfactual regime changes,
and the extent to which they rely on maintained assumptions about unob-
served components of preferences and their distributions. The most com-
mon strategy in papers examining the EITC and hours is to use instrumen-
tal variables (IV) methods. Eissa and Hoynes (1998) use the IV strategy to
estimate variants of  1and  2, which they then use to simulate the eﬀects of
changes in the EITC on hours of work. The IV approach also has the ben-
eﬁt of its relative simplicity and holds the promise of obtaining wage elas-
ticities that can be used to analyze more general policy changes. At the
same time, these methods are vulnerable to the concerns raised above about
reliance on wage and income elasticities to make inferences about the
eﬀects of program changes characterized by nonlinear, and especially non-
convex, budget sets. Furthermore, the usefulness of these estimates de-
pends on the validity and power of the instrumental variables themselves—
that is, that the variation in the instrument reﬂects variation that is
exogenous to the (endogenous) net wages and incomes of individuals.
Summary of Studies of Eﬀects of the EITC on Labor Market Outcomes
We draw four broad conclusions from the empirical work on the EITC
and labor force participation and hours. First, based on the evidence from
many studies, the EITC positively aﬀects the labor force participation of
single-parent households. Second, in aggregate, the positive participation
eﬀects appear to be fairly substantial. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), for
example, suggest that as much as 62 percent of the increase in single moth-
ers’ labor force participation between 1984 and 1996 could be attributed to
the EITC, while as much as 35 percent of the increase from 1992 to 1996
could be attributed to the credit. Labor force participation elasticities with
respect to net-of-tax income reported in table 3.4 range from 0.69 to 1.16,
and could be as large as 1.7 for former and current welfare recipients.
Third, as would be expected given the tax treatment of secondary workers
in two-earner couples, the EITC has a modest, negative eﬀect on labor
force participation for secondary workers in two-parent families. Fourth,
the EITC appears to have a small negative eﬀect on hours worked by those
in the labor force, but some studies (Dickert, Houser, and Scholz 1995;
Keane and Moﬃtt 1998; and Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001) suggest that the
aggregate hours eﬀect of the EITC, once participation eﬀects are ac-
counted for, is positive.
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related issues, but more could usefully be done. First, Hotz, Mullin, and
Scholz (2002a) ﬁnd that employment elasticities with respect to EITC
changes are signiﬁcantly higher for welfare recipients than they are for oth-
ers. Further work on the EITC and employment, particularly for subpop-
ulations, may be useful. Second, additional attention could be paid to
augmenting the labor market proxies employed in the studies. Some evi-
dence suggests that state unemployment rates, the variable typically used,
are too blunt, which makes it hard to disentangle business cycle eﬀects
from policy changes. Third, the behavioral responses to the EITC may
change over time. This possibility is suggested by Moﬃtt (1999), who ﬁnds
that welfare participation appears to be more sensitive to changes in labor
market conditions during the 1990s than was the case in earlier decades.
Ellwood (2000) also emphasizes the fact that the “combination of welfare
sticks, EITC carrots, and a remarkably strong economy had a multiplica-
tive eﬀect that is far greater than any one or two of these policies would
have had on their own” (p. 1084). Work would be valuable that helps poli-
cymakers better anticipate the eﬀects of policy changes, adopted individu-
ally and in packages, in diﬀerent economic environments.
3.5.4 Estimates of the Eﬀects of the EITC 
on Other Behavioral Outcomes
Marriage and Family Formation
As noted earlier, the EITC can lead to large marriage penalties and
bonuses depending on the relative incomes between potential partners.
Once these incentives have been clearly documented, as is done by Dick-
ert-Conlin and Houser (1998) and Holtzblatt and Rebelein (1999), it is nat-
ural to ask whether they aﬀect behavior.
Three recent papers examine whether the EITC encourages the existence
of female-headed families.41 Dickert-Conlin and Houser (2002) look at
correlations between EITC changes and female headship. They account
for the fact that couples aﬀect their EITC through their marital and labor
supply choices, and they ﬁnd little eﬀect of the EITC on marriage deci-
sions. Eissa and Hoynes (1999) also ﬁnd modest or nonexistent eﬀects on
family formation.
Ellwood (2000) takes a diﬀerent strategy. Rather than isolating the spe-
ciﬁc eﬀect of marriage on tax and transfer payments, he looks at data from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and focuses on 1,671 mar-
riages that women in the sample entered between 1983 and 1991. He mea-
sures penalties and bonuses by income in the last year prior to marriage
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41. Also see Dickert-Conlin (1999) for a more general look at taxes, transfers, and separa-
tions.and in the ﬁrst year after marriage to look at whether families would be net
winners or losers had the 1996 EITC provisions been in place when they
married. Clearly other factors (like postmarital childbearing or other
changes in income) can aﬀect these comparisons. Ellwood then looks at
patterns of marriage incentives over time across wage and skill groups and
at the corresponding marriage patterns. He ﬁnds no evidence that EITC
marriage penalties or bonuses aﬀected marriage.
The evidence on the EITC’s eﬀects on marriage and fertility mirrors the
broader evidence from the literature on transfer programs. Moﬃtt (1998)
surveys studies of the eﬀects of welfare on marriage and fertility and con-
cludes that “a neutral weighing of the evidence still leads to the conclusion
that welfare has incentive eﬀects on marriage and fertility,” but the eﬀects
tend to be small and cannot explain time series increases in nonmarital fer-
tility and declines in marriage rates. Moﬃtt also notes that results tend to
vary signiﬁcantly based on the methodology used and other speciﬁcation
diﬀerences.
Human Capital Formation42
Until now, we have ignored the potential impacts of the EITC on an im-
portant issue related to the ability of the EITC to alleviate poverty—
namely, its eﬀect on human capital or skill development among workers.
The argument is sometimes made that prowork programs provide a double
bonus, because they induce people to work, and, by going to work, low-
skilled individuals can acquire productive skills that can enhance their fu-
ture earnings. Drawing from the literature on human capital investment,
the issue is what eﬀect the EITC has on skill formation and wage growth
among low-skilled populations.
Formal models of human capital investment emphasize that the decision
of workers to invest in skill formation depends on the comparison of the
opportunity cost associated with time spent acquiring skills with the future
returns to wages that result from the acquired human capital. As noted by
Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002), programs that aﬀect the value of
market work, such as the EITC, may aﬀect these costs and returns. The
eﬀect of the EITC is further complicated by the diﬀerential impacts it has
on eﬀective wage rates. As noted above, the EITC raises the eﬀective wage
rate in the phase-in region, leaves it unchanged in the ﬂat region, and low-
ers it in the phaseout region. Thus, whether the opportunity costs of hu-
man capital investments and the returns from such investments are raised
or lowered by the EITC depends critically on which part of the EITC ap-
plies and over what time intervals.
Moreover, exactly how programs like the EITC aﬀect skill acquisition
and life-cycle wage growth depends on what model characterizes the hu-
The Earned Income Tax Credit 185
42. This section draws heavily on Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002).man capital accumulation, or production, process. In particular, if one as-
sumes that work-related skills are largely acquired as a by-product of
work—that is, via “learning by doing” (LBD)—then programs that en-
courage greater labor force participation and hours of work will tend to en-
courage skill acquisition.43 In contrast, if learning, either via formal
schooling or while on the job, is rivalrous with working, as is the case with
an “on-the-job training” (OJT) model, policies that encourage work may
discourage skill acquisition.44
Using data from the 1980 CPS, Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002) es-
timate the structural parameters for hours of work and wage equations
proﬁles for OJT and LBD models of life-cycle human capital investment
and time allocation. Based on these models, the authors simulate the
eﬀects of the presence of an EITC on life-cycle labor supply decisions, hu-
man capital investments, and wage growth. Their simulations imply very
diﬀerent patterns of EITC eﬀects on these decisions across the OJT and
LBD models of human capital formation, even though the models do not
appreciably diﬀer in their ﬁt of the data. For example, their simulations
show that although the two models yield similar predictions of the eﬀects
of the EITC on human capital formation via its eﬀect on labor market en-
try by females, they yield diﬀerent eﬀects on the intensive labor supply
margins. In particular, the EITC has large eﬀects on training in an OJT
model but weak eﬀects on labor supply. It has little eﬀect on skills and
larger labor supply eﬀects within the LBD model they examine.
These provocative ﬁndings by Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa suggest
the need to devote attention to the life-cycle implications of EITC changes
in order to understand the potential for the credit to improve the skills, and
thus the well-being, of disadvantaged populations in the United States.
Consumption
A central issue when thinking about the EITC and consumption is the
degree to which the credit allows people to smooth the marginal utility of
consumption. One would think that the advance payment option might
help people do this. However, in 1998 only 185,027 (1.1 percent) of
16,118,328 of EITC claimants with qualifying children took advantage of
this option.
Barrow and McGranahan (2000) examine whether consumption ap-
pears to increase for EITC-eligible families in months, particularly Febru-
ary, when they are likely to receive the EITC. The topic is an interesting
one, since the models economists typically use to think about consumption
would predict that families would not immediately spend their EITC upon
186 V. Joseph Hotz and John Karl Scholz
43. See, for example, Weiss (1972) for an exposition of the formal model of LBD applied to
the human capital investment context.
44. This is true in the human capital models of Becker (1964) and Ben-Porath (1967).receipt, but rather would spread EITC-ﬁnanced consumption over the
year (or lifetime). Hence, standard models would predict no discernible
eﬀect. Yet there is some evidence that signiﬁcant portions of the popula-
tion are liquidity constrained and hence have consumption patterns that
track income receipt very closely.
The authors use monthly data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
of nondurables and durables from 1982 through 1996. Using regression
models of monthly consumption with month dummies, month dummies
interacted with (simulated) EITC eligibility, and family economic and de-
mographic characteristics, they ﬁnd that EITC-eligible households spend
approximately 9 percent more on durable goods in February, the modal
month of EITC refund, than do households not eligible for the credit. They
show that these results are not driven by income diﬀerences or diﬀerences
in family size between EITC-eligible and EITC-ineligible families. They
also show that the seasonal eﬀects are larger after the 1990 EITC expan-
sions, as would be expected. The estimated magnitudes suggest that EITC
recipients spend roughly one-ﬁfth of the full amount of their refund in the
month of receipt.
Smeeding, Ross-Phillips, and O’Connor (2000) ﬁelded a survey of low-
income taxpayers who used tax preparation services at a neighborhood le-
gal clinic in Chicago and solicited detailed information about the antici-
pated and actual uses of the EITC. The study provides information on how
the EITC is used by families, such as for purchasing a car, paying tuition,
changing residences, paying bills, or purchasing food. A next step in this
research program would be to examine what families would do at the mar-
gin with, say, an additional $100 a month through regular earnings (or wel-
fare) and compare that to the uses to which the lump-sum EITC is put. The
authors suggest that the lumpiness of the EITC might allow people to
make investments that enhance social mobility. Further work examining
this conjecture would be valuable.
3.6 Assessing Proposed and Potential Modiﬁcations to the EITC
Given the central role played by the EITC in the nation’s antipoverty
programs, it is not surprising that a broad range of possible credit modiﬁ-
cations has been raised. Like the historical forces shaping the credit, these
ideas tend to push the credit toward improving behavioral incentives or to-
ward enhancing its antipoverty eﬀectiveness. In this section we discuss
some of these issues.
3.6.1 Marriage Penalties
Proposals regularly address EITC-related marriage penalties. Several
things should be kept in mind when thinking about these. First, the tax sys-
tem cannot simultaneously be progressive (have increasing average eﬀec-
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ation, and be neutral with respect to marriage. Hence, either penalties for
singles or marriage penalties are inevitable, unless the structure of individ-
ual income taxation is dramatically altered. Second, as noted by Holtzblatt
and Rebelein (1999), 62 percent of EITC-related marriage penalties are
borne by couples with incomes above the amount necessary to be eligible
for the EITC. We suspect that policymakers are considerably less con-
cerned about the marriage penalty that arises for a worker with earnings of
$40,000 and his spouse with earnings of $10,000 (if they split and the
spouse took the children, she could get a large EITC) than they are about
the family-formation incentives that apply to unemployed or sporadically
employed workers with or without children. Third, an extensive literature
has examined the eﬀects of antipoverty programs on marriage and fertility
generally and has found relatively small eﬀects.
3.6.2 Administering the EITC through the Tax System and Other Issues
of Credit Design
During debates over restructuring the IRS,45 the EITC was sometimes
referred to as a “non-tax function of the IRS.” The rationale for this senti-
ment is that tax rules are suﬃciently complex that it is already beyond the
IRS’s ability to eﬀectively administer the laws required to accurately collect
taxes. Asking the IRS to administer the EITC diverts resources that could
help the IRS better collect taxes.
There is, of course, a clear relationship between all tax expenditures and
spending programs so that any deviation from a comprehensive income tax
could be viewed as a situation where the IRS is being asked to carry out
some function other than tax collection to achieve some social purpose.46
The practical question to pose in optimally conﬁguring the tax system and
spending programs is what the marginal cost is of providing speciﬁc incen-
tives through the tax system relative to the best alternative delivery mech-
anism. In the case of the EITC, there are strong arguments in support of
running the EITC through the tax code. Because ﬁling thresholds are fairly
low and because of overwithholding, most low-income families with earn-
ings already ﬁle tax returns. Consequently, they are already in the system,
so the incremental cost of claiming the EITC is low. The IRS collects in-
come information from both employers and employees, so it is straightfor-
ward in most circumstances to verify income eligibility. The IRS has little
ability to document living arrangements, however, so a signiﬁcant number
of errors arise in determining who is able to claim an EITC-qualifying
child. New developments with the Federal Case Registry of Child Support
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45. See, for example, “The New IRS Law,” Albert Crenshaw, Washington Post,23 July 1998,
A6.
46. See Surrey (1973) for an early discussion of the concept of tax expenditures.Orders may improve the IRS’s ability to handle this aspect of EITC eligi-
bility.
Just because a case can be made that an EITC-like subsidy may appro-
priately be delivered through the tax code does not mean that the EITC is
optimally designed. Liebman (1999) examines the optimal phaseout rate of
the EITC. A more rapid phaseout will reduce the utility of some EITC re-
cipients and may cause some taxpayers to leave the labor market. At the
same time, it will reduce the cost of the program, which, if the marginal ex-
cess burden of tax collections is high enough, may lead to an increase in
overall welfare given speciﬁc social welfare weights on diﬀerent income
groups. Liebman uses simulation analyses to highlight the magnitudes of
the various behavioral issues in question. Results are naturally sensitive to
the compensated labor supply, the marginal excess burden of taxes, and the
characteristics of the assumed social welfare function. His simulations
tend to result in optimal phaseout rates that bracket the current rates for
families with one child and two or more children.
3.6.3 Adjusting Further for Family Size and Tighter Integration with the
Tax System
In 1998 the child poverty rate for families with three or more children
was 28.5 percent, twice the 11.9 percent rate for children in smaller fami-
lies. A way to address the higher poverty rates of families with three or
more children is to add a third tier to the federal EITC schedule for these
families, which would result in an EITC schedule similar to the structure
of the Wisconsin state EITC. One speciﬁc proposal implemented this idea
by increasing the phase-in rate to 45 percent from 40 percent, adding
nearly $500 to the maximum EITC available to a taxpayer with three or
more children. The potential drawbacks of the idea are that it costs money
and it further increases incentives for people to have children and, in some
circumstances, to become single parents.
The Minnesota state EITC also may have worthwhile lessons for the fed-
eral credit. Recall that Minnesota adjusts its phase-ins and phaseouts of
the state credit to smooth notches that are generated by features of the fed-
eral and state tax and transfer programs. As is clear when plotting the bud-
get sets facing families with one child and two children, there are unusual
notches and kinks, particularly when the eﬀects of transfer programs are
taken into account. It would be straightforward to alter the phaseout rates
to smooth marginal tax rates at the income levels around which families be-
gin to pay positive levels of federal income taxes (in the absence of the
EITC). This would increase headaches for people trying to describe the
structure of the credit, but it would have little practical consequence for
people taking the credit since the credit amount is invariably found from
look-up tables in the EITC instructions or by requesting the IRS to calcu-
late the credit. At the same time, although smoothing the phaseout rates
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quence, since it is unlikely that any but the most sophisticated workers
would recognize the link to incremental labor market decisions and the size
of their lump-sum EITC after ﬁling tax returns.
Cherry and Sawicky (2000) and Ellwood and Liebman (2000) go well be-
yond the Minnesota model and develop more systemic policy proposals
that would, under some options, integrate the EITC, dependent exemp-
tion, and child credit. The Cherry-Sawicky “uniﬁed universal child credit,”
for example, would rise for an initial range of earnings, ﬂatten out over an
additional range, and then phase down to a minimum beneﬁt of $1,270 per
child, an amount that equaled the value of the dependent exemption and
child credit for a taxpayer in the 28 percent bracket when their proposal
was designed. The uniﬁed universal child credit would cost more than $30
billion per year, but the modiﬁcation would reduce some of the labor mar-
ket disincentives and marriage penalties that arise in the current EITC, sig-
niﬁcantly increase beneﬁts available to low- and moderate-income families
with many children, and provide considerable additional tax beneﬁts to
families with children and incomes between roughly $25,000 and
$50,000.47 Although a complete analysis of this idea is well beyond the
scope of this chapter, both papers oﬀer far-reaching ways to improve the
tax system.
3.6.4 EITC and TANF Interactions
As state TANF programs evolve, clear rules need to be made about what
kinds of state-subsidized activities will trigger EITC eligibility and what
activities will not. The polar cases are easy to identify: TANF payments
that are like payments made under AFDC would not qualify as income for
the purposes of the EITC. Wages earned while a single mother works
and receives a TANF grant for child care will be considered income for
the EITC. Congress has explicitly indicated that “work-experience” and
“community-service” jobs will not trigger the EITC. But there is a vast
gray area of other TANF-supported activities that need to be clariﬁed. The
trade-oﬀs in clarifying the rules are apparent: making as many people en-
gaged in worklike activities eligible for the EITC as possible will be more
costly than having more restrictive rules, but it will also provide an addi-
tional source of support to poor families, and the EITC may help reinforce
the work-expectation message that is at the core of many state TANF pro-
grams. Attention might also be paid to the link between the EITC and
TANF-based asset tests.
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47. Somewhat thorny technical issues would need to be worked out, such as who would re-
ceive the uniﬁed universal child credit in situations where a noncustodial parent is currently
paying child support and receiving the dependent exemption and the custodial parent is re-
ceiving the EITC. Integrating the dependent exemption and EITC could result in pressure to
rewrite many divorce settlements.3.6.5 The Advance Payment Option
Only 1.1 percent of EITC recipients with children used the advance pay-
ment option in 1998. Low use of the advance payment option has gener-
ated considerable discussion in policy circles, although we think this at-
tention is somewhat misplaced. Simple calculations suggest that eschewing
the advanced payment option, as currently designed, costs the taxpayer at
most $52.77 (assuming the taxpayer could receive the maximum available
advance payment each month, earns 8 percent interest, and does not re-
ceive his or her refund until May). Given that low-wage workers may
change jobs frequently, the transactions costs associated with setting up
advanced payments can be fairly high. This, coupled with the possibility
that someone will receive too much in advance payments and have to pay
it back at tax time,48 suggests that the utility cost of failing to take advan-
tage of the advance payment option is probably small.
It is sometimes suggested that greater use of the advance payment option
would reinforce the prowork message of the EITC. Partly for this reason,
oﬃcials in the United Kingdom designed their EITC-like program, the
Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), to include incremental receipt of
payments throughout the year. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the U.S. and U.K. experiences, however.49 The WFTC is paid through the
employer and is retrospectively based on earnings, hours worked, and fam-
ily income during the six-week period prior to the beginning of the pay-
ment period (the previous six months). Thus, someone could have a job,
become eligible for the WFTC, and then leave the job and still receive the
WFTC for the duration of the six months. Rules are in place to curb eﬀorts
to manipulate income to maximize the WFTC, but there is not yet any ev-
idence of their eﬀectiveness. Other aspects of the British tax system suggest
that less emphasis is placed on compliance (and perhaps that greater em-
phasis is placed on minimizing the intrusiveness of tax authorities and as-
sociated forms) than occurs in the United States, which may result in a
greater willingness to tolerate overpayments or underpayments that might
arise with the WFTC. The WFTC replaced the Family Credit, which was
also delivered incrementally through the year.
3.7 Summary and Conclusions
Over the last twenty-ﬁve years, the EITC has become, by a considerable
margin, the country’s largest cash or near-cash program directed at low-
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48. Holtzblatt and Liebman (1998) note that taxpayers are less likely to receive too much in
EITC advance payments if income is only from wages. Only about one in four EITC claimants
has income from only one source during the year, however. Advance payments also lengthen
the time between when money is paid out and when the IRS is able to verify eligibility.
49. See Holtzblatt and Liebman (1998) for a more detailed discussion.income families. Its popularity is fairly easy to account for. Unlike safety
net programs such as AFDC, TANF, and food stamps, the EITC gives no
beneﬁts to those without labor earnings. Thus, it subsidizes the incomes of
people who in some sense are “doing the right thing.” The appeal of this
reaches across party lines. In addition, unlike the safety net programs, the
EITC has unambiguously positive labor market participation incentives.
By virtue of the fact that it provides no beneﬁts for the most destitute, the
EITC is not a substitute for the safety net. But its desirable labor market
eﬀects (relative to other safety net programs) and its targeting of the work-
ing poor undoubtedly account, at least in part, for its rapid growth.
Research on the EITC has been a growth industry in the last decade. In
our review we have been struck by the variety of diﬀerent topics and ap-
proaches taken by researchers. We can think of no major EITC-related
topic that has not received at least some attention from serious scholars,
possibly with the exception of the economic incidence of the credit. But
that is not to say that we know everything necessary about the credit. We
lack information about the participation rate of the credit since the mid-
1990s. Research on the labor market eﬀects of the credit have pushed
quasi-experimental and IV repeated cross-sectional analyses using the
CPS to their logical limits, but there have not been utility-based structural
analyses of the EITC. Nor have there been any longitudinal analyses of the
EITC, which hold considerable promise for controlling for unobservables
in ways that are impossible with the CPS. Research on the EITC and fam-
ily structure and fertility is in its infancy. Work initiated by Heckman,
Lochner, and Cossa (2002) also has considerable potential for enhancing
understanding of the eﬀects of the EITC and other policies directed at low-
wage labor markets.
Stepping back further from current thrusts of the literature, two poten-
tially promising new ways for research to develop are apparent. First,
Smeeding, Ross-Phillips, and O’Connor (2000) raise an important issue.
To what extent and through what channels can the EITC enhance eco-
nomic well-being? Are there nonlinearities associated with the EITC, pos-
sibly through its lumpiness, that allow the credit to enhance well-being in
a way that diﬀers signiﬁcantly from equivalent-sized (in total) payments
received throughout the year?
Second, it is easy for researchers to focus on narrow, well-deﬁned ques-
tions that lend themselves to standard (or possibly innovative) method-
ological tools. Perhaps as a consequence, however, less attention has been
paid to the design of the constellation of public policies that are or could
be directed at low-wage labor markets. Questions along these lines would
include the following: What are the relative merits of the EITC and em-
ployer-based wage subsidies, of the EITC, and of the minimum wage? Do
the answers diﬀer given existing tax and transfer provisions? Can the
broader tax and transfer system be altered or more tightly integrated in
192 V. Joseph Hotz and John Karl Scholzwelfare-enhancing ways? The speciﬁc research questions that have domi-
nated the EITC agenda are critical stepping stones for satisfactory answers
to these more global issues, but it would be inappropriate as research
evolves to study only the narrower issues at the expense of the broader.
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